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Abstract
This thesis is arranged in two main parts. Each part relies an approach using the
methods of psychophysics and computational modeling to bring abstract or high-
level theories of vision closer to a concrete neurobiological foundation.
The first part addresses the topic of visual object categorization. Previous stud-
ies using high-level models categorization have left unresolved issues of neurobi-
ological relevance, including how features are extracted from the image and the
role played by memory capacity in categorization performance. We compared
the ability of a comprehensive set of models to match the categorization perfor-
mance of human observers while explicitly accounting for the models’ numbers
of free parameters. The most successful models did not require a large memory
capacity, suggesting that a sparse, abstracted representation of category properties
may underlie categorization performance. This type of representation—different
from classical prototype abstraction—could also be extracted directly from two-
dimensional images via a biologically plausible early vision model, rather than
relying on experimenter-imposed features.
The second part addresses visual attention in its bottom-up, stimulus-driven
form. Previous research [Parkhurst et al., 2002] showed that a model of bottom-up
visual attention can account in part for the spatial positions of locations fixated
by humans while free-viewing complex natural and artificial scenes. We used a
similar framework to quantify how the predictive ability of such a model may be
enhanced by new model components based on several specific mechanisms within
the functional architecture of the visual system. These components included richer
interactions among orientation-tuned units, both at short-range (for clutter reduc-
tion) and at long-range (for contour facilitation). Subjects free-viewed naturalistic
i
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and artificial images while their eye movements were recorded. The resulting fixa-
tion locations were compared with the models’ predicted salience maps. We found
that each new model component was important in attaining a strong quantitative
correspondence between model and behavior. Finally, we compared the model
predictions with the spatial locations obtained from a task that relied on mouse
clicking rather than eye tracking. As these models become more accurate in pre-
dicting behaviorally-relevant salient locations, they become useful to a range of
applications in computer vision and human-machine interface design.
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Preface
The passing of a major milestone in life1 is always an occasion for reflection, espe-
cially when, as one colleague put it, “you have had about this much [holds hand
about an inch in front of eyes] perspective on your research for the past six years.”
Indeed the view is a bit different when one takes a step back: here is what I wrote
(in part) as I applied for admission to the Computation and Neural Systems pro-
gram at Caltech in fall of 1997:
I have always been fascinated by the great mysteries of nature, yet
at times I have felt reluctant to single one out for further study, at the
expense of being forced to neglect the others. Having realized, how-
ever, that one cannot specialize in all the mysteries (except perhaps in
kindergarten), and uneasy about the prospect of specializing in noth-
ing at all, I decided upon a compromise. I embarked on a search for my
center of intellectual gravity—that specialty that would be reinforced
rather than undermined by my interests that formally lie outside the
specialty.
I have performed this search by the admittedly haphazard proce-
dure of reading one book, mulling it over, then moving on to what I
fell impelled to read next. In the past year, this technique has taken
me from (roughly in order) Ishmael (Daniel Quinn, 1992) to Dreams of a
Final Theory (Steven Weinberg, 1992), Shadows of the Mind (Roger Pen-
rose, 1992), A Brief History of Time (Stephen Hawking, 1988), Conscious-
1If completing my Ph.D. doesn’t qualify as a major milestone, I have the impending rollover of
a significant digit (who shall remain nameless) in my age to use as a backup milestone.
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ness Explained (Daniel Dennett, 1991), The Language Instinct (Stephen
Pinker, 1994), Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (Daniel Dennett, 1995), At Home
in the Universe (Stuart Kauffman, 1995), The Extended Phenotype (Richard
Dawkins, 1982), The Astonishing Hypothesis (Francis Crick, 1994), Elbow
Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Daniel Dennett, 1984),
The Intentional Stance (Daniel Dennett, 1987), Higher Superstitions (Paul
Gross and Norman Levitt, 1994), The Tao of Physics (Fritjof Capra, 1975),
The Third Culture (John Brockman, 1995), The Embodied Mind (Francisco
Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, 1991), The Quark and the
Jaguar (Murray Gell-Mann, 1994), The Story of B (Daniel Quinn, 1996),
The Bell Curve (Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, 1994), The Mis-
measure of Man (Stephen Jay Gould, 1996), and Neurophilosophy (Patricia
Churchland, 1986). These sources, along with journal articles, some
textbook reading, participation in online discussion groups, and con-
versations with the world-class professors and peers that surround me
at the University of Wisconsin, have led me to that center of intellectual
gravity that has always been within me but only now apparent to me.
Daniel Dennett, in Consciousness Explained (1995), defines a mys-
tery as “a phenomenon that people don’t know how to think about—
yet.” From the human perspective, nature’s deepest mysteries have
been those of origins: the origin of the universe and its physical laws,
the origin of life, the origin of minds. Unifying these mysteries is the
tantalizing question of how something could possibly come from noth-
ing: how matter arises from the void, how complexity emerges from
chaos, how subjective experiences derive from automata. These ques-
tions have so baffled us that for most of our history only one solution
has been remotely conceivable, in which each origin is seen as the man-
ifestation of a new ontological category. Only recently have earnest
attempts been made to explain these origins within the confines of the
material world without separate ontological categories for life or for
minds. Although smaller mysteries still surround aspects of each ori-
gin, we are no longer entirely bewildered. The one remaining exception
seems to be human consciousness, which as Dennett says, “is just about
the last surviving mystery.”
For this reason, it is the study of the mind/brain in which I have
decided to specialize. Now, it may be said this is hardly any special-
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ization at all, for this is a broad subject legitimately claimed by a num-
ber of traditional academic departments. Yet for reasons ranging from
the entirely reasonable logistical demands of scientific research to occa-
sional unintended ignorance, the theories within one department typi-
cally span only a portion of the entire spectrum of thought surrounding
the subject. And since no one department has yet been able to claim the
one right way to think about the subject, I feel that the interdisciplinary
nature of the developing cognitive science is of utmost importance. Al-
though it imposes some obstacles in forcing one to become fluent in
the jargon and pretheoretical conceptions of each of the component dis-
ciplines, this can only strengthen the theories forged by the interdis-
ciplinary coalition. Clearly I will be selecting a narrower focus than
simply mind/brain studies for my graduate work, but I hope to main-
tain a high level of competence in the interdisciplinary background that
surrounds my focus.
I hope to participate in a future of cognitive science that I expect will
be quite exciting and full of surprises. Patricia Churchland and Ilya Far-
ber, in “Consciousness and the Neurosciences: Philosophical and The-
oretical Issues” (in The Cognitive Neurosciences, Michael Gazzaniga, ed.,
1995), suggest that many of our current concepts about the mind are
essentially prescientific, and awaiting us is a transition in which these
concepts will be transformed and perhaps displaced by more precise
and predictively powerful scientific concepts. Indeed, cognitive sci-
ence is at a point where the right questions have yet to be asked, and
a conceptual framework will evolve alongside the empirical answers
that hang upon it. That science often proceeds this way is an important
lesson.
Another key lesson concerns the vital relationship between science
and society. Science is not done in isolation. Particularly with ques-
tions regarding the human mind, the answers will have ramifications
in such sensitive areas as law, politics, ethics, and human rights, among
many others. When the implications of a clearer scientific understand-
ing of the mind are at odds with our previous conceptions, we must be
willing to take an honest look at the old ideas to identify any buried
motives and superstitions that underlie the conflict. We would do well
to remember Bertrand Russell’s thoughts (The Autobiography of Bertrand
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Russell, 1967): “I [believe] in the value of two things: kindness and clear
thinking. . . . I find that much unclear thought exists as an excuse for
cruelty, and that much cruelty is prompted by superstitious beliefs.”
It is to promote and practice kindness and clear thinking that I in-
tend to pursue an academic career. In this capacity, the greatest respon-
sibility is to internalize the process and the conscience of science, and to
evidence these qualities in research and teaching. I firmly believe that
when performed this way, science does good, whether its benefit to so-
ciety be direct, such as through cures for disease, or indirect, through
the expansion of humankind’s wisdom. I could not wish for more than
to contribute to this cause through the study of the human mind, where
a greater understanding would benefit us all on both personal and so-
cietal levels.
As I consider the path that led me from raw inspiration to a concrete culmina-
tion in this thesis, I am also reminded of the many people to whom I owe debts
of gratitude. First of all, to my thesis advisor Christof Koch: for your guidance
and patience and focus, for sharing in my excitement and frustrations, and for set-
ting a superb example for how to be a scientist and for how to be a colleague. To
the sources of financial support for my graduate research: a Predoctoral Fellow-
ship from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute; the National Imagery and Map-
ping Agency (NIMA), now known as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA); the Sandia National Laboratories; the Engineering Research Centers (ERC)
Program of the National Science Foundation under Award Number EEC-9402726;
the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH); and the W.M. Keck Foundation
Fund for Discovery in Basic Medical Research at Caltech. To past and present
members of my thesis committee: Richard Andersen, Pietro Perona, Chris Adami,
John Allman, Shin Shimojo, and those who have been my collaborators in the work
presented in this thesis, Fabrizio Gabbiani and Laurent Itti. To my colleagues who
have enriched my research as well as helping me to avoid work and enjoy the
rest of life on occasion: Chun-Hui Mo, Jorge Jovicich (for his humor as well as for
providing an alibi while I went shopping for a wedding ring), Gabriel Kreiman,
McKell Carter, Sarah Farivar, Adam Hayes, Ofer Mazor, Nao Tsuchiya, Fei Fei Li,
Rufin Van Rullen, Dirk Walther, Jeff Colombe, Matt Nelson, Asha Iyer. To my
teachers all the way back to kindergarten whose creativity still inspires me. To ev-
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eryone at Caltech who helped me keep the music going: Bill Bing, Lou Madsen,
Gary Leskowitz, Matt Ashman, Clancy Rowley, Ryan Cabeen, Kjerstin Easton, Jay
Bartroff, Gene Short, Lyle Chamberlain, Steve Snyder, and everyone in the Thurs-
day Jazz Band who has come and gone through the years. To all my family, espe-
cially Mom and Dad: for the loving and nurturing environment you have always
provided, and for inspiring me to strive for excellence. Finally, to my wife Kasi:
for your endless love and support, and for always believing in me, there are no
words, so I’ll say “nothing at all.”
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 We open our eyes and see
We open our eyes and we see.
It’s so simple. Yet the human visual system achieves such computational feats
that to reproduce them with the conscious “I” would confound even the most
prodigious mathematical mastermind. Our brain tells us “same” for the visage of
a loved one, whether that face is seen in sunlight or firelight or starlight, whether
seen from left, right, near or far, whether the face has aged by a few days or a few
decades; yet, show us that same face next to its brother or sister, and our brain in-
stantly tells us “different” even when the two faces are seen in precisely the same
pose and lighting. Meanwhile, our eyes make on the order of 100,000 saccadic eye
movements every day, masking the oft-forgotten fact of visual life that our visual
acuity decays dramatically outside the central few degrees of the visual field.
Since it is the collective conscious “I” of all of us as scientists and engineers that
designs artificial machine vision systems, such systems inherit a paradox that has
plagued artificial intelligence: the tasks that are simple and efficient for human
observers (such as identifying that loved one’s face) are monumental challenges
for machine vision systems, while other tasks that are nearly impossible for hu-
man vision (differentiating a “T” from an “L” in the periphery) are trivial for a
computer program. Thus, machine vision and human vision currently have com-
plementary strengths and weaknesses. But ultimately it is critical that machine
vision systems be able to assist human observers even in tasks that are tradition-
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ally human-friendly yet seem computationally intractable by today’s means.
Recent developments in the computational neuroscience of vision have sug-
gested an innovative technology for addressing these goals, that of neuroscience-
enabled machine vision. This thesis describes work that aims to build a more con-
crete understanding of the workings of specific mechanisms of the visual system,
through a proof-by-example approach: we construct working computational mod-
els and test whether they match the behavior of psychophysics subjects. If (when)
the models pass this test, we have gained knowledge in the neurobiology of vision,
and along the way we may have built a better machine vision system as well.
Nature is fond of arranging things in twos, and the visual system is no excep-
tion: starting from two eyes, the world is split into two (left and right) visual half-
fields, information from each being sent to two separate half-brains. Millions of
years of evolution in the presence of a ubiquitous visual horizon has taught the
brain to further split the world into upper and lower visual half-fields (and to pay
extra attention to the lower one). From the retina, visual information also begins
a divergence into two parallel processing streams, one (roughly) for motion and
spatial judgments, and one for shape and color; these are variously named as the
where/what, or magno/parvo, or action/perception, or dorsal/ventral pathways [Schnei-
der, 1969, Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982, Mishkin et al., 1983, Goodale and Mil-
ner, 1992, Milner and Goodale, 1993, Tanaka and Shimojo, 1996]. These parallel
streams provide the top-level structural organization of this thesis, which contains
two main parts: the first addresses visual object categorization, or how do we know
what we’re looking at?, and the second addresses visual attention how do we know
where to look?
1.2 Categorization
One of the basic perceptual constructs of the visual system is the division of the
world into discrete objects, separate from each other and separate from the back-
ground. Not only are the objects segregated, but they have meanings or labels
attached, which can readily lead a verbal description or other overt behavior. Fur-
thermore, the visual system often provides a hierarchy of appropriate labels, de-
pending on the context. The basic-level category [Rosch et al., 1976] is what most
people will answer when shown an object (or a picture of one) and asked “what is
that?” This is the category level at which members share a similar shape and set
of features; thus, different basic-level categories are distinguished by having dif-
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ferent shapes or different constituent features. The basic-level category is a visual
category, not a linguistic or semantic one, because categories occupying the same
linguistic level are not always at the same visual level. In an oft-cited example,
when people are asked to name a picture of a bird, they will likely respond with
“bird,” unless the picture contains an ostrich or a penguin, in which case they will
be very unlikely to respond with “bird,” but rather will use the more specific term
(unless they are bird experts; see Tanaka and Taylor, 1992). This can be explained
by the fact that most birds do share a common shape, while those species that are
exceptions to the rule will belong to a separate basic-level category. Other exam-
ples of basic-level visual categories are human faces, four-door sedan automobiles,
jogging shoes, and ball-point pens.
At levels higher than the basic level, the hierarchy of categories ultimately ex-
tends out of an exclusively visual domain and into the linguistic domain, where we
find categories like animals, plants, chairs, and food. Here we find objects like steak
sandwich and fruit salad that, despite sharing few visual characteristics, are both as-
sociated with the same category label “food.” Objects of these superordinate-level
categories can be identified and named on the basis of visual evidence, to be sure,
but the category boundaries are not learned by strictly visual means.
Moving in the other direction through the hierarchy, more detailed than the
basic-level category is the subordinate-level category. Examples of subordinate-
level categories include male faces and female faces (subordinate categories of
the basic-level category of human faces) as well as different models of four-door
sedan. In addition to sharing a similar shape and set of features, members of a
subordinate-level category also typically share a common spatial arrangement of
those features. On the other hand, members of different subordinate-level cate-
gories within the same basic-level category are distinguished from each other by
having different spatial arrangements of the same features. This is the level that
is associated with expertise; in fact a common definition for visual expertise in
a certain domain is the ability to perform subordinate-level tasks with the same
speed and precision as basic-level tasks. Thus it is said that we are all natural-born
experts at face recognition, for upon viewing a face we recall the person’s name
just as quickly as we identify the fact that it is a face in the first place. The same
characteristic is found in trained experts in other fields, such as car enthusiasts or
bird watchers. Some evidence from fMRI suggests that the same fusiform face area
[Kanwisher et al., 1997] that is involved in face processing may also be involved in
expert processing of subordinate-level category information [Gauthier et al., 1997,
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1999, 2000b,a, Tarr and Gauthier, 2000].
Part I of this thesis focuses on computational models of subordinate-level cate-
gorization. We begin in Chapter 2 by introducing several simple sets of schematic,
line-drawn objects, each sharing a common set of features and differing in the
spatial arrangements of those features. Subsequent chapters explore the ways in
which such stimuli might be processed by the visual system: how the raw sensory
input from the retina is transformed into a compact intermediate representation
(Chapter 5), what the nature is of this intermediate representation (Chapter 4), and
finally how this representation can be used to reach a categorization decision about
the input stimulus (Chapter 3).
1.3 Attention
A neuron anywhere in the visual system undoubtedly exemplifies another of na-
ture’s dichotomies: bottom-up and top-down influences. Bottom-up processes
are typically thought of as stimulus-driven, unconscious, automatic, not subject
to voluntary control, and produced by anatomical feed-forward connections. Ex-
amples of bottom-up processes in vision include the detection of a flash of light,
the “pop-out” of a red object amongst a green background, or the identification of a
face. Jerry Fodor [1985] has used the term cognitively impenetrable to describe early
bottom-up processes: we cannot voluntarily alter them, and furthermore we can-
not determine the mechanisms for their action by introspection. Although bottom-
up visual processing seems subjectively simple because it requires no voluntary
effort and is cognitively impenetrable in any case, any computational neurosci-
entist or machine vision engineer will attest that the underlying mechanisms are
far from simple. In a metaphor from computer programming, this is classic infor-
mation hiding: the visual system shields the conscious “I” from a mass of imple-
mentation complexity with a trivially simple interface (i.e., we open our eyes and
see).
Standing in contrast to bottom-up processes are top-down processes: driven by
cognitive beliefs, conscious, subject to voluntary control, produced by anatomical
feedback connections. An example of a top-down process is the situation where
one views an ambiguous scene, with no identifiable subject, yet when one is cued
to look for a particular object (such as the well-known dalmatian dog in the half-
tone image), the previously unseen object now becomes readily apparent. More-
over, upon viewing the same scene again at a later time, the object is perceived
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without delay. Another common example of top-down processing is the Rorschach
inkblot test, in which people are shown inkblots that have no “true” interpreta-
tion, yet high-level cognitive states force an interpretation of the image from the
top down.
Although bottom-up and top-down processing are eternally entwined, a com-
putationally tractable modeling effort begins by treating the two separately at first.
Thus Part II is aimed at the continued development a computational model of
bottom-up component of visual attention, which we compared with the locations
fixated by human observers while they freely viewed several types of images.
Chapter 6 shows that this model can account for a significant fraction of the fixation
locations, even in apparently high-level tasks, like looking for interesting things in
an image. Chapters 7 and 8 introduce two new model components that improved
the model’s realism in replicating biological information processing, with a focus
on nonlinear interactions within and across the neural representations of basic vi-
sual cues (like horizontal and vertical orientations). Interestingly, this improved
biological realism increased the models ability to predict locations either looked at
or pointed to by human observers with very high statistical significance. Finally,
Chapter 9 introduces a “mouse-clicking” method as a lightweight alternative to
eye tracking.
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Part I
Visual object categorization
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CHAPTER 2
Categorization psychophysics with
parametric stimuli
2.1 Introduction
Visual object recognition and categorization are critically important to the survival
of many animal species, notably humans. These processes constitute an impres-
sive computational feat, in that we are able to, on the one hand, lump together as
“same” a set of views of an object seen under different conditions that produce
radically different patterns of light on the retina, yet on the other hand, mark as
“different” two views of different objects under similar viewing conditions that
produce very similar patterns of light falling on the retina.
In the last thirty years, research in mathematical psychology has discovered
much about the processes of visual categorization [e.g., Reed, 1972, Nosofsky, 1984,
1991, Ashby, 1992a, Ashby and Maddox, 1993, Smith and Minda, 1998, Ashby and
Waldron, 1999] by combining the techniques of visual psychophysics and compu-
tational modeling to develop high-level theories of categorization. Despite the
predictive success of these theories, there exists a gap between the descriptive
framework of the models, and our current knowledge of the neuronal mechanisms
involved in categorization. An important aim therefore is to shorten this gap by ex-
tending models so that their implementations are reasonable in light of recent de-
velopments in the neurophysiology of object recognition and categorization [Kan-
wisher, McDermott, and Chun, 1997, Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten, and
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Haxby, 1999, Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, and Miller, 2001, Sigala and Logo-
thetis, 2002, Op de Beeck, Wagemans, and Vogels, 2001, Ashby and Ell, 2001].
Most categorization models assume, perhaps tacitly, a categorization process in
which
• the immediate sensory representations of incoming stimuli occupy a very
high-dimensional space (for vision, this comes to millions of dimensions
when we consider that output of each retinal ganglion cell amounts to a sin-
gle dimension);
• this very high-dimensional representation is transformed into an intermedi-
ate space of lower dimensionality by combining the simple features of the
early representation (such as oriented edges) into more complex features
(such as T- or L-junctions or simple shapes);
• finally, a computational process operates in this lower-dimensional space and
produces an explicit categorization result that can be the basis for a behav-
ioral response (such as a button-press in a psychophysics experiment).
Here, we address each of these three key steps with categorization models in-
formed by psychophysics experiments and neurobiology. We will visit the topics
in reverse order: our goal is to describe how a categorization decision is made for
a visual object, and each of the next three chapters takes a step toward filling in the
details of this process back to the retinal input. First, in Chapter 3 we compare sev-
eral existing models of visual object categorization and introduce a new roaming ex-
emplar model (RXM) that highlights the importance of certain model characteristics
in matching human behavior. Second, in Chapter 4 we delve into the nature of the
intermediate representation using multidimensional scaling (MDS). Third and last,
many models in the psychological literature ignore the transformation which turns
raw sensory data into a succinct set of nameable features; we explore this step in
detail in Chapter 5 using a model of early vision similar to “HMAX” [Riesenhuber
and Poggio, 1999] to drive subsequent phases of the categorization process.
Eighteen psychophysics subjects (ages 18–25) from the Caltech community par-
ticipated as paid volunteers in the experiments described in the following three
chapters. Informed consent was obtained from all subjects, and experimental pro-
cedures were approved by the California Institute of Technology’s Committee for
the Protection of Human Subjects.
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2.2 Psychophysical methods
Like many other studies of visual object categorization, we used schematic line-
drawn stimuli. Many insights into the principles of categorization have been ob-
tained with minimalistic stimuli, such as the circles shown in Figure 2.1. We used
three types of schematic, line-drawn visual stimuli with somewhat more complex-
ity (Figure 2.2): Brunswik faces and tropical fish outlines, which have been used
previously, plus a new set of “cartoon face” images. Each type of visual object
was parameterized along four dimensions comprising the stimulus parameter space.
For each object type, different sets of objects were assigned to configurations, which
contained equal numbers of training exemplars assigned to each of two categories,
as well as an additional number of test exemplars. The training exemplars from the
two categories were always chosen so as to be linearly separable in the objects’
parameter space; that is, the members of the two categories could be separated by
some 3-D hyperplane in the 4-D parameter space.
d θ
Figure 2.1. An example of the type of parametric stimuli used in previous studies [e.g.,
Maddox and Ashby, 1993] of visual object categorization. In this example, the objects are
circles with a bisecting line defined by two features: the diameter d of the circle and the
angle θ of the bisecting line. Experiments using these stimuli typically involve categories
devised so that both features must be analyzed in order to determine category member-
ship. For example, category 1 might include all small circles as well as some medium-sized
circles with nearly-horizontal bisectors, while category 2 would include all large circles as
well as medium-sized circles with nearly-vertical bisectors. In such an experiment, the
question of interest would be to quantitatively understand how observers categorize the
ambiguous objects of medium size with diagonal bisectors.
2.2.1 Brunswik faces
These simple line-drawn face stimuli (Figure 2.2a; Brunswik and Reiter, 1937) have
been used frequently in categorization experiments both with human [Reed, 1972,
Nosofsky, 1991] and non-human observers (pigeons, Huber and Lenz, 1996; mon-
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keys, Sigala et al., 2002). Each face consists of a simple ovaloid outline with internal
features defined by (compressed) circles and straight lines. The faces are parame-
terized by eye height (EH; the vertical distance from the centers of the eyes to the
center of the face), eye separation (ES; the horizontal distance separating the centers
of the eyes), nose length (NL; the vertical length of the nose line), and mouth height
(MH; the vertical distance from the center of the face to the mouth line).
2.2.2 Cartoon faces
These stimuli (Figure 2.2b) were introduced in an fMRI study [Jovicich, Peters,
Koch, Chang, and Ernst, 2000] that showed them to produce stronger activation in
the human fusiform face area [Kanwisher et al., 1997] than did Brunswik faces (see
Section 2.3 below). The cartoon faces extend the Brunswik faces in several ways to
make the faces appear more human: a simple band of hair is added around the top
of the head, the size and dilation of the pupils may be varied, eyebrows are added
above the eyes, the nose outline is defined by an extended open contour, and the
mouth is defined as a Bezier curve rather than a straight line. To control these addi-
tional features, the cartoon faces have a total of 28 stimulus parameters; however,
in the present study only the four parameters corresponding to the Brunswik face
dimensions were varied, while the other 24 parameters were held constant.
2.2.3 Tropical fish outlines
These line-drawn images (Figure 2.2c) were first used to offer a completely novel
stimulus set to monkey observers in a categorization task [Sigala et al., 2002]. Other
fish images have been used previously in studies of categorization in people and
pigeons [Hernstein and de Villiers, 1980] and in monkeys [Vogels, 1999]. Each fish
image is composed of four cubic spline curves that were fitted to scanned outlines
of tropical fish. By adjusting one control point of each of the curves, four features of
the outlines could be smoothly deformed: the dorsal fin (DF), tail fin (TF), ventral
fin (VF), and mouth area (MA).
2.2.4 Stimulus rendering
All of the stimuli described here were generated and displayed to subjects us-
ing GroovX, a custom software software designed for psychophysics and object-
oriented graphics. The package is licensed under the GNU General Public Li-
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(a) Brunswik faces (b) Cartoon faces
(c) Fish outlines
(EH) Eye height
(ES) Eye separation
(NL) Nose length
(MH) Mouth height
(EH) Eye height
(ES) Eye separation
(NL) Nose length
(MH) Mouth height
(DF) Dorsal fin
(TF) Tail fin
(VF) Ventral fin
(MA) Mouth area
ES
ES
TF
DF
VF
MA
EH
EH
NL NL
MH
MH
Figure 2.2. Three object types, each with four stimulus parameters controlling that object
type, were used in similarity and categorization psychophysics tasks. Three sample ob-
jects of each type demonstrate the typical ranges of the parameters. (a) Brunswik faces.
(b) Cartoon faces. Although these faces are described by 28 parameters, the present
study used only the 4 parameters corresponding to those in (a). (c) Fish outlines.
cense (GPL), and is freely available for download from the internet. Currently
documentation and source code may be found online at this web address: http:
//www.klab.caltech.edu/rjpeters/groovx/. In the event that this software later
moved to a different location it should be locatable via a number of popular inter-
net search engines using the keyword GroovX.
2.3 Neural representation of schematic stimuli
To provide a foundation for our categorization model results to be eventually gen-
eralized into the domain of natural (i.e., photorealistic rather than schematic or
14 CATEGORIZATION PSYCHOPHYSICS
>
L
R
L
R
L
R
L R
L R
L R
Figure 2.3. BOLD activity observed with fMRI while subjects viewed photos of either faces
(top row) or houses (middle row), and the contrast between two conditions showing regions
which were more active during face viewing (bottom row). This contrast reveals bilateral
activation in the lateral occipital cortex (LO) and fusiform face area (FFA).
line-drawn) visual stimuli, we used an fMRI experiment [Jovicich et al., 2000] to
assess whether the schematic Brunswik and cartoon faces produced neural activa-
tion in the same fusiform face area (FFA) that is known to be activated by photos of
real faces [Kanwisher et al., 1997]. Four healthy adult subjects (2 females, 2 males,
ages 18–23) participated; all were right-handed and had corrected-to-normal vi-
sion. The stimulus sequences contained six 30 s stimulus epochs interleaved with
seven 20 s fixation epochs. In each stimulus epoch, subjects passively viewed rapid
sequences of either faces or houses (2.5 Hz presentation rate, 75 images per epoch).
Whole brain single shot T2*-weighted spiral functional images were acquired
using the manufacturer’s head birdcage coil on a 1.5-Tesla scanner (General Elec-
tric Signa, Milwaukee, WI). Imaging parameters were: TE=50 ms, TR=2500 ms,
3.125× 3.125 mm in-plane resolution, 4 mm-thick axial slices, 1 mm slice gap. Data
were processed using standard procedures in SPM99b. Before statistical analy-
sis, data were motion corrected, Tailarach normalized, and spatially smoothed.
The data were analyzed using a fixed-effects statistical model comprising subject-
specific effects (signal change during face viewing and signal change during house
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Figure 2.4. Same conditions as in Figure 2.3, except that cartoon faces and cartoon house
were used in place of the photos. Compared to the condition with face and house photos,
activation here in LO and FFA is reduced on the right side, and is nearly absent on the left
side.
viewing). Activation was defined as the difference in the signal changes between
the face and house conditions. For each subject, data were scaled to the global
brain mean and analyzed separately to locate the areas which responded more to
faces than to houses during the different stimuli sequences. The strength of the
effect was then averaged in these areas across subjects for each condition.
When we looked for areas that were significantly more activated by photos of
real faces than by photos of real houses (Figure 2.3)1, we found strong bilateral
activation in the lateral occipital (LO) cortex (p < 0.001, uncorrected) as well as in
the inferior temporal gyrus consistent with the FFA (p < 0.001, uncorrected). For
comparison with the Brunswik and cartoon faces, we designed schematic house
stimuli with different levels of complexity to match the subjective complexity of
the different face stimuli. In the analogous face/house comparisons, we found FFA
activation for the cartoon faces that was strongly right-side dominant (Figure 2.4),
and we found no detectable FFA activation for the Brunswik faces (Figure 2.5).
This does not rule out the possibility that Brunswik faces activate neurons in the
1Thanks to Nancy Kanwisher for the use of the face and house photo databases.
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Figure 2.5. Same conditions as in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, except that Brunswik faces and
simple house cartoons were used. No activation was observed in either LO or FFA.
FFA; since there is less variability between different Brunswik faces than between
different cartoon faces or face photos, it would be expected that the Brunswik faces
would activate a smaller pool of FFA neurons, and the lack of observable activity
might simply indicate that these neurons are undergoing adaptation during the
course of each 30 s epoch. In any case, our results do offer positive confirmation
that at least the cartoon faces activate neurons within the same FFA pool as those
activated by real face photos.
CHAPTER 3
Categorization models
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a number of models that attempt to mimic human catego-
rization decisions using a mechanism based on the multidimensional representa-
tion of incoming stimuli, plus possible auxiliary representations, such as mem-
ory traces. This process is typically controlled by a number of free parameters,
which are fitted with the goal of matching human categorization behavior. How-
ever, a simple statistical comparison between models—even after accounting for
the number of free parameters—may ignore important differences in the neurobi-
ological implications of the models. For example, one successful model, the gener-
alized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1984), assumes that all training images are
stored in memory; a literal interpretation of the GCM might conclude that the
neuronal substrate of categorization also scales linearly with the number of ex-
emplars in a category, or that categorization in biological systems involves only
simple memorization, without any category-level abstraction [Knowlton, 1999].
To provide a more detailed look at such issues, we introduce a roaming exemplar
model (RXM) that draws from neural networks [Poggio and Girosi, 1990, Rosseel,
1996] and exemplar-based models of categorization [Nosofsky, 1991, Kruschke,
1992, Nosofsky, Kruschke, and McKinley, 1992]. The RXM also has much in com-
mon with the striatal pattern classifier (SPC) of Ashby and Waldron [1999], includ-
ing the fact that its memory traces are free parameters. This stands in contrast to
previous exemplar-based models, and hence neurobiological plausibility can be
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assessed directly by accounting for numbers of free parameters when comparing
fitted models.
3.2 Categorization psychophysics tasks
Subjects participated in categorization experiments consisting of a training phase
and a testing phase. In both phases, subjects viewed a series of objects presented
one at a time. Each object was shown for 2 s, followed by 2 s of blank screen. Dur-
ing each 4 s trial, subjects pressed one of two buttons indicating to which category
the object belonged. In the training phase, subjects were shown only the two cate-
gories’ training exemplars, and were given feedback in the form of a high- or low-
pitch tone indicating whether their response was correct or incorrect, respectively.
Subjects performed training blocks of 100 trials until they scored ≥ 85% correct
on a single block. Next, they moved into the testing phase, in which they were
shown the previously unseen test exemplars in addition to the training exemplars
that they had viewed during the training phase. Subjects received no feedback on
their responses during the testing phase.
In Experiment 1, the values for each stimulus dimension were quantized to
three possible values for each dimension, so that the set of possible objects lay
on a 3×3×3×3 grid in stimulus parameter space. The configuration of 20 objects
on this grid (Figure 3.1a) followed that used in Nosofsky [1991] and Sigala et al.
[2002], with five training exemplars for each category, plus ten test exemplars that
included the two category prototypes. For each set of objects, each of the four
stimulus parameters for that object type was assigned to one of the four generic
dimensions in the stimulus configuration shown in Figure 3.1a. It is significant
how the parameters are assigned, since each generic dimension carries different
information about category membership. For example, the categories were lin-
early separable in projections onto 2-D planes for pairs of stimulus dimensions
(1, 2), (1, 3), and (1, 4), so dimension 1 was more informative about an object’s
category than were the other dimensions. In all, five sets of stimuli were used in
Experiment 1. These included three sets of Brunswik faces in which the stimulus
parameters were assigned to the generic dimensions in different orderings ({EH,
ES, NL, MH}, {NL, MH, EH, ES}, and {MH, EH, NL, ES}), a set of cartoon faces
({EH, ES, NL, ML}), and a set of fish outlines ({TF, VF, DF, MA}). The twenty ob-
jects in each of these configurations are shown in Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.
In Experiment 2, a larger configuration of 80 objects was used (Figure 3.7), with
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10 training exemplars for each of the two categories, plus 60 test exemplars. The
exemplars were arranged on a 7×7×7×7 grid in the stimulus parameter space.
There were 12 such sets, identical except that the discretization grid of each set was
rotated through different angles (θ = n · 15◦, n ∈ [0 . . . 11]) in the eye-height/eye-
separation plane of parameter space.
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Figure 3.1. Experiment 1 used five 20-object sets, each defined in a 4-D parameter space.
(a) The abstract configuration is shown in projections onto the six possible pairs of dimen-
sions. All exemplars fall on a 3×3×3×3 grid, except for the two category prototypes, which
were among the test exemplars. Dashed lines indicate where the two categories’ training
exemplars are linearly separable. (b-f) For illustration, the training exemplars of category
one (thin black lines) are superimposed upon those of category two (thick gray lines).
(b) Cartoon faces with dimensions {1=EH, 2=ES, 3=NL, 4=ML} (see also Figure 3.2).
(c) Fish outlines {TF, VF, DF, MA} (Figure 3.3). (d) Brunswik faces {EH, ES, NL, MH}
(Figure 3.4). (e) Brunswik faces {NL, MH, EH, ES} (Figure 3.5), and (f) Brunswik faces
{MH, EH, NL, ES} (Figure 3.6). See Figure 2.2 for abbreviations.
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category 1
training exemplars
category 2
training exemplars
test exemplars
Figure 3.2. Cartoon faces {EH, ES, NL, ML} used in experiment 1.
category 1
training exemplars
category 2
training exemplars
test exemplars
Figure 3.3. Fish outlines {TF, VF, DF, MA} used in experiment 1.
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test exemplars
Figure 3.4. Brunswik faces {EH, ES, NL, MH} used in experiment 1.
category 1
training exemplars
category 2
training exemplars
test exemplars
Figure 3.5. Brunswik faces {NL, MH, EH, ES} used in experiment 1.
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category 1
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category 2
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test exemplars
Figure 3.6. Brunswik faces {MH, EH, NL, ES} used in experiment 1.
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Figure 3.7. Experiment 2 used these 12 sets of Brunswik faces. Each image shows the
10 training exemplars of category one (thin black lines) superimposed upon the 10 training
exemplars of category two (thick gray lines). The sets differ only in the angle by which the
objects are rotated in eye height-eye separation plane of feature space.
3.3 Categorization models
We tested several categorization models by fitting them to match the human ob-
servers’ response profiles from the testing phase of the categorization tasks. Each
model receives input in a 4-D feature space (i.e., not image space), and produces an
output that represents a categorization probability for the input object. The mod-
els we tested fall into several categories, each of which proposes a unique architec-
ture for the categorization process (see Figure 3.8), with different free parameters,
and different assumptions about the memory usage of the system being modeled.
These factors must be weighed along with the raw goodness-of-fit when assessing
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the neurobiological plausibility of the different models.
In general, the categorization models assume the following:
• that each exemplar x has a unique representation in an R-dimensional space
[Ashby, 1992b],
x = (x1, . . . , xR),
whose components may be drawn either from the original stimulus config-
uration, from a multidimensional scaling configuration (see Chapter 4), or
from a configuration based on features extracted from an early-vision model
(chapter 5), and
• that each category is defined by N training exemplars
{x1, . . . , xN}.
3.3.1 Exemplar models
Exemplar models associate memory traces of M (with 1 ≤ M ≤ N) stored exem-
plars1
{y1, . . . , yM}
with each category. Several model subtypes differ in the way that these stored
exemplars are selected:
• All-exemplar models (Figure 3.8a) assume M = N, and yi = xi. All of the
training exemplars are explicitly stored in memory, so these models have a
high memory demand that is linear in the number of training exemplars.
All-exemplar models include the average-distance model (ADM, Reed, 1972)
and generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1991).
• Prototype (one-exemplar) models (Figure 3.8b) assume M = 1; each category
stores only the arithmetic mean of the category’s training exemplars, y1 =
1
N ∑i xi. These models have low and constant memory demand, independent
of the number of training exemplars; however, the models imply a more com-
plex computational mechanism to estimate the prototype during trial-by-trial
1Our usage of the term “exemplar” to denote stored memory traces reflects a meaning of ideal
meaning or pattern or prototype, rather than a strict meaning of previous seen stimulus. For example,
in the RXM, the stored exemplars are generalizations of the memory traces used in all-exemplar or
prototype models, and are most likely not previously seen stimuli.
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stored exemplar/prototype
training exemplar
category 1:
training exemplar
stored exemplar/prototype
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P1
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(a) all-exemplar model (b) one-exemplar model
      (prototype model)
(c) roaming exemplar
      model〈2〉; striatal
      pattern classifier〈2〉
(e) cue-validity model(d) linear boundary model
Figure 3.8. Schematic depictions of several kinds of categorization models. Each dia-
gram shows a hypothetical set of training exemplars from two categories (• and ◦) in a
2-D feature space, plus a test exemplar (×) which is to be classified. (a,b,c) Three types
of models which rely on distances (indicated by dashed lines) between a test exemplar
and each stored exemplar from both categories: (a) all-exemplar model, in which the set
of stored exemplars is just the set of training exemplars; (b) one-exemplar, or prototype
model, in which the single stored exemplar per category is the arithmetic mean of that cat-
egory’s training exemplars; (c) roaming-exemplar model〈M〉 (RXM〈M〉) and striatal pattern
classifier〈M〉 (SPC〈M〉), in which each category has M (in this case, M = 2) stored exem-
plars, which must lie within the polygon that circumscribes the training exemplars (dotted
lines). The RXM〈M〉 uses a summed-similarity decision rule, while the SPC〈M〉 uses a
uses a nearest-neighbor decision rule. (d) Linear boundary model, in which the model
uses a linear boundary that separates the categories to classify test exemplars according
to the side of this boundary on which they fall. (e) Cue-validity model, which classifies a
test exemplar according to the total cue-validity across all features; the cue-validity cv i for
category i of a given feature is the posterior probability of an exemplar with that feature
belonging to category i (values of cv1 and cv2 are shown).
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exposure to the training exemplars. Prototype models include the weighted
prototype model (WPM; Reed, 1972) and the weighted prototype similarity model
(WPSM; Nosofsky, 1991).
• In the proposed roaming-exemplar model〈M〉 (RXM〈M〉, Figure 3.8c), each cat-
egory stores M exemplars, each of which is a linear combination of the train-
ing exemplars for that category, y j = ∑i wijxi. Under the neurobiological
consideration that neurons do not represent objects far different from those
that have been previously observed, the stored exemplars are restricted to
a region circumscribed by the training exemplars, so the weights are con-
strained by wij ≥ 0 and ∑i wij = 1 for all j. The number of stored exemplars
M is not a free parameter of a given RXM〈M〉, but the stimulus parameters
of those stored exemplars are free parameters of the model. Thus, when the
RXM is fitted to a dataset, the number of stored exemplars is chosen and
fixed at the start, although RXM〈M〉’s with different (fixed) values of M may
be fitted to the same dataset. The memory demand of the RXM〈M〉 varies be-
tween that of the prototype models (for M = 1) and that of the all-exemplar
models (for M = N); the computational complexity is similar to that of the
prototype models, since some mechanism must adjust the stored exemplars
during training.
Next, the exemplar model computes a similarity measure between the test ex-
emplar x and each of the stored exemplars y, based on a weighted Euclidean dis-
tance:
dα(x, y) =
√
∑
j
αj(xj − yj)2,
with αj ≥ 0 and ∑ αj = 1 (other metrics are possible; e.g., Ashby and Maddox
1993). The coefficients αj, called attentional weights, are intended to model the abil-
ity of human observers to attend preferentially to the most task-relevant stimulus
features. The similarity s decays with the distance d, either linearly (s = −d, as in
the RXM, ADM and WPM), or exponentially (s = e−cd, as in the GCM and WPSM;
see Shepard, 1987).
Then, for each test exemplar x, the evidence Ei for category Ci is given as the
sum of similarities between x and the M stored exemplars yij of that category:
Ei(x) =
M
∑
j=1
s(x, yij).
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Finally, the model’s categorization of x is based on the expression
E1(x)− E2(x) + n > t,
where n represents zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance σ2, and t is a thresh-
old parameter; x is assigned to category 1 if this expression is true, otherwise to
category 2.
The free parameters of the exemplar models are thus (α, c, t, σ), plus 2M stored
exemplars for the RXM〈M〉.
3.3.2 Striatal pattern classifier
The RXM shares a very similar mathematical formulation with the striatal pattern
classifier (SPC) proposed by Ashby and Waldron [1999], although the mathematical
elements have been treated with different neurobiological interpretations [Ashby
and Ell, 2001]. Both kinds of model rely on a set of units that represent different
locations in feature space, but the models differ in how each category’s evidence
is computed for a given test exemplar. The exemplar models compute the sum
of similarities between the test exemplar and each stored exemplar, whereas the
SPC associates a test exemplar with the category of the nearest striatal pattern (in
this respect the SPC resembles a k-nearest neighbor model with k = 1). Both the
SPC and the RXM use a similarity measure that decays linearly with distance. In
order to maintain a formal similarity with the other models, we used the following
decision rule for the SPC: for each test exemplar, the evidence for each category
is given by the maximum of the similarities between the test exemplar and that
category’s stored exemplars. Thus, in the case of one stored exemplar per category,
the SPC〈1〉 and the RXM〈1〉 form identical decision surfaces. However, with M >
1, the SPC〈M〉 has a piecewise-linear boundary, while the RXM〈M〉 has a curved
decision boundary.
3.3.3 Boundary models
Decision bound theory [Ashby and Maddox, 1993] proposes that human percep-
tions of category exemplars are instances of random variables with multivariate
normal distributions. Given a particular perception, the optimal decision strategy
is to choose the category of which that perception was more likely an instance.
Thus the decision boundary (the locus where both categories have equal pr
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bility densities) falls along the intersection of the graphs of the two probability
density surfaces. If the covariance matrices of the exemplar distributions are iden-
tical for the two categories, then the decision boundary is a linear surface (i.e., a
hyperplane); otherwise, it is a quadratic surface.
We tested the probit linear model (PBI; Figure 3.8d; Ashby and Gott, 1988),
which is trained to separate the categories’ training exemplars with a boundary
described by a normal vector b and a threshold t. Following training, a test exem-
plar x is classified according to the side of the boundary on which it falls:
x · b + n > t ⇒ x ∈ C1
The PBI model parameters are (b, t, σ); however the variance of the noise is as-
sumed to be σ2 = 1, since for any λ 6= 0, the two models given by (b, t, σ) and
(λb, λt, λσ) are identical.
3.3.4 Cue-validity models
Cue-validity models (Figure 3.8e) treat each stimulus parameter as an independent
indicator of category membership, based on the relative numbers of exemplars
from the two opposing categories that exhibit the cue (a particular value of a stim-
ulus parameter). Thus, for example, a beard is a somewhat uncommon feature of
male faces, yet it is an even less common feature of female faces, and so provides
a highly valid cue to the gender category of a face.
In the weighted cue-validity model (WCVM; Reed, 1972), the validity for cate-
gory Ci of the j-th parameter xj of a test exemplar x is defined as
vij(x) = p(Ci|xj).
The overall cue-validity Vi is a weighted sum of these validities,
Vi(x) = ∑
j
αjvij(x),
where the αj are attentional weights as in the exemplar models, with α j ≥ 0 and
∑j αi = 1. Also as in the exemplar models, the decision rule incorporates Gaussian
noise n and a threshold t; if the expression
V1(x)− V2(x) + n > t
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is true, x is assigned to category 1, otherwise to category 2.
A modified version of this model, called the weighted frequency cue-validity
model (WFCVM; Reed, 1972), uses a different definition for the validity. A weight
factor,
q =
1
1 + F(xm)
,
is computed from the overall number of times F(xm) that the parameter value xm
occurs in exemplars from both categories. Then the WCVM’s original validity vij
is used to define the new validity
v˜ij(x) =
1
2
· q + vij(x) · (1− q),
so that the validities of rare parameter values carry little information about cate-
gory membership. This reflects the idea that subjects will pay more attention to
common features.
The free parameters for both the WCVM and the WFCVM are (α, t, σ).
3.4 Model fitting
We fitted models based on several alternative representations for the schematic
stimuli:
• the objects’ physical parameter values (discussed in this chapter),
• the psychophysical parameter values obtained from multidimensional scal-
ing (see Chapter 4), and
• the features derived an early vision model (Chapter 5).
Furthermore, each model could either be fitted separately to each individual sub-
jects’ data, or be fitted once to data pooled across subjects. However, since pooled
fits may not accurately reflect the categorization processes of individual observers
[Maddox, 1999], we used only models fitted to individual subjects’ data.
Each model’s free parameters were fitted to maximize its ability to predict the
categorization probabilities obtained from human observers. The goodness of this
fit was quantified with the likelihood L of the model having generated the observed
probabilities, given that the fitted model correctly describes the subject’s catego-
rization process [Collett, 1991]. This likelihood is the conditional probability of the
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set of observed probabilities pi, given the values of the model parameters (which
govern the predicted probabilities pˆi), over the N stimulus objects:
L =
N
∏
i=1
(
ni
pini
)
(pˆi)pini(1− pˆi)(1−pi)ni ,
where ni is the number of categorization trials performed for object i, and pini is
the number of trials in which the observer assigned object i to category one. The
likelihood takes the form of a binomial distribution because subjects’ responses
are treated as independent binary random variables. A numerical implementa-
tion of adaptive simulated annealing [Ingber, 1989] followed by a simplex method
[Nelder and Mead, 1965] was used to maximize the likelihood L, or equivalently,
minimize the minus loglikelihood (− ln L), which can be computed more efficiently.
The range of the likelihood is 0 ≤ L ≤ 1, so the range of the minus loglikelihood is
∞ ≥ − ln L ≥ 0.
We used the percentage of variance (%-variance) explained by the model as a
more tangible measure for comparing fitted models. This measure is simply given
by r2, the square of the correlation coefficient between the observed and predicted
probabilities.
Finally, although the loglikelihood (ln L) or %-variance are appropriate statis-
tics for comparing fitted models having similar numbers of free parameters, com-
parisons of models differing in their number of free parameters, Nfp, require a
statistic such as the Akaike information criterion [Zucchini, 2000],
AIC = −2 ln L + 2Nfp,
which contains a penalty term proportional to Nfp. Pairwise model comparisons
were made with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test of either − ln L or the AIC, and we
report the median value of − ln L or the AIC to summarize the model fits from a
group of individual subjects.
3.5 Model fits: Experiment 1
We found no systematic differences in the fits obtained from different model sub-
types (such as those using exponential versus linear decay of similarity with dis-
tance). Therefore, in subsequent discussion, models are referred to by their general
names (e.g., all-exemplar models) rather than by the specific subtypes (e.g., ADM
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Table 3.1. Goodness-of-fit of the categorization models tested in Experiment 1.
GCM PBI WPSM WCVM
Brunswik faces {EH, ES, NL, MH} % variance 98.22 98.08 96.39 88.37
− ln L 21.15 22.23 27.32∗ 42.50∗
Brunswik faces {NL, MH, EH, ES} % variance 95.68 97.75 95.32 74.38
− ln L 28.08 26.53 32.81 42.58∗
Brunswik faces {MH, EH, NL, ES} % variance 94.02 58.56 61.55 86.30
− ln L 36.83 80.57∗ 90.31∗ 52.76
cartoon faces % variance 95.50 90.70 90.18 86.66
− ln L 30.68 29.95 37.07∗ 53.49
fish outlines % variance 97.23 80.98 70.30 96.03
− ln L 20.73 32.85∗ 74.36∗ 28.74
% variance (larger value indicated better fit)
− ln L, minus loglikelihood (smaller value indicates better fit)
bold numbers, model(s) which gave the best fit in each row
∗, models whose − ln L was significantly worse (p < 0.05) than the best-fitting model in each row
or GCM).
Table 3.1 summarizes the fits of the all-exemplar, linear boundary, prototype,
and cue-validity models, for each of the five sets of objects used in Experiment 1,
along with significance values for pairwise comparisons of the models using the
Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test2. There were two general patterns of
model fits.
The first pattern was associated with the first two Brunswik face sets ({EH,
ES, NL, MH} and {NL, MH, EH, ES}, which depend primarily on attention to
the eyes and nose) and the cartoon faces ({EH, ES, NL, ML}). In this pattern, the
all-exemplar models obtained the best fit, but the boundary model also fit well, in-
distinguishable from the exemplar models. The prototype models fit significantly
worse (p < 0.05) than the all-exemplar models, but the magnitude of this differ-
ence was small. Finally, the cue-validity models fit significantly worse than the
other models.
The second pattern was seen with the third Brunswik face set ({MH, EH, NL,
ES}) and the fish outlines ({TF, VF, DF, MA}). As in the first pattern, the all-
exemplar models obtained the best fit. However, the rest of the pattern was quali-
tatively different from the first pattern. Whereas the cue-validity models gave the
worst fits in the first pattern, their fits were indistinguishable from the all-exemplar
2Note that the RXM and SPC were not used in fitting the data from Experiment 1 because even
with one stored exemplar, these models carry almost as many free parameters as the number of data
points to be fitted (20). This renders any comparisons among such models virtually meaningless.
This issue is avoided in Experiment 2 due to the greater number of test exemplars (80).
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Table 3.2. Goodness-of-fit of the models tested in Experiment 2. See also Table 3.3 for
further discussion of the models’ qualitative properties.
RXM〈1〉 RXM〈2〉 RXM〈3〉 SPC〈1〉 SPC〈2〉 SPC〈3〉 GCM PBI WPSM
% variance 89.36∗ 90.98∗ 91.49 89.36∗ 90.83∗ 91.64 86.84∗ 87.10∗ 84.90∗
− ln L 75.72∗ 72.06∗ 71.32∗ 75.72∗ 71.65∗ 69.92 83.41∗ 83.66∗ 88.79∗
AIC 173.44 178.13∗ 188.64∗ 173.44 177.30∗ 185.84∗ 178.81∗ 177.32 189.57∗
% variance (larger value indicated better fit)
− ln L, minus loglikelihood (smaller value indicates better fit)
AIC, Akaike Information Criterion (smaller value indicates better fit)
bold numbers, model(s) which gave the best fit in each row
∗, models whose fits were significantly worse (p < 0.05) than the best-fitting model in each row
models in the second pattern. In addition, the boundary model fit very poorly,
significantly worse than the exemplar models (p < 0.05). Finally, the prototype
models fit even more poorly, significantly worse than the exemplar and boundary
models (p < 0.05).
3.6 Model fits: Experiment 2
We fitted subjects’ categorization probabilities from Experiment 2 with versions of
the roaming-exemplar model and striatal pattern classifier using 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and
10 stored exemplars3, as well as the all-exemplar, prototype, and linear boundary
models, and assessed these fits with three measures (see Table 3.2): the loglikeli-
hood, the %-variance explained, and the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
When the model fits were assessed with their minus loglikelihoods (Table 3.2,
row 2), we observed a pattern among the previously tested models similar to the
first pattern observed in Experiment 1: the all-exemplar and boundary models
both obtained better (lower) scores than the prototype model. However, each of
these previous models was outperformed by all versions of the roaming-exemplar
model and striatal pattern classifier. In addition, for both the RXM〈n〉 and the
SPC〈n〉 the goodness of fit increased with the number n of stored exemplars—an
unsurprising result, given that each stored exemplar reflects additional free pa-
rameters. The %-variance values (Table 3.2, row 1) show a similar pattern, but give
a more concrete assessment of how well the models match the human subjects’
categorization behavior: the best-fitting model (the SPC〈3〉) captured nearly 92%
3For brevity, the models with 5, 7, and 10 stored exemplars were withheld from Table 3.2, since
our analysis revealed these data to merely continue the trends seen with 1, 2, and 3 stored exem-
plars.
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of the variance, while the worst-fitting model (the WPSM) captured roughly 85%
of the variance.
In contrast, when the model fits were assessed with the AIC to account for their
numbers of free parameters (Table 3.2, row 3), the RXM and SPC with one stored
exemplar per category (RXM〈1〉 and SPC〈1〉) obtained the best (lowest) scores
among all models. These comparisons were statistically significant (p < 0.05,
Wilcoxon signed rank test) except against the PBI (p = 0.44). Moreover, increasing
the number of stored exemplars in either the RXM〈n〉 or SPC〈n〉 was detrimental to
the AIC goodness of fit; the SPC〈10〉 (AIC = 253.29) and RXM〈10〉 (SPC = 271.85)
fit much worse than any of the other models.
3.7 Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed a pattern of model fits similar to that reported previously
[e.g., Reed, 1972, Nosofsky, 1991, Maddox and Ashby, 1993, Sigala et al., 2002]. We
found that across several categorization tasks involving different types of objects,
an all-exemplar model provided better fits than did a linear boundary model, pro-
totype model, or cue-validity model (Table 3.1). In some cases the fits of the linear
boundary and prototype models approached those of the all-exemplar model.
The relative strengths of all-exemplar models and boundary models have been
discussed at length in the literature [McKinley and Nosofsky, 1996, Maddox and
Ashby, 1998, Nosofsky, 1998]. Since each model differs from the others in more
than one way, it is difficult to conclude which of these differences contribute to a
model’s success under particular test conditions. To address this point, we intro-
duced a “roaming-exemplar” model (RXM) that can treat independently some of
the factors that were mutually dependent in previous models. It shares a flexible
memory storage architecture with the striatal pattern classifier [Ashby and Wal-
dron, 1999, Ashby et al., 2001]. It shares a decision mechanism with all-exemplar
models and prototype models, since new exemplars are classified by comparing
the sums of their similarities to the stored exemplars associated with each of two
categories. However, in the roaming-exemplar model as well as the striatal pat-
tern classifier, these stored exemplars are not strictly determined by the training
exemplars, but are allowed to “roam” during training within the feature space of
the objects to be classified.
In Experiment 2, we analyzed individual subjects’ categorizations of 12 differ-
ent sets of Brunswik faces by fitting them with the roaming-exemplar model and
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Table 3.3. Qualitative comparison of the key models that were tested in Experiment 2.
model type stored main decision boundary iso-probability goodness-
exemplars contours of-fit
shape orientation rank (AIC)
linear boundary none linear arbitrary linear 2 (177.3)
prototype 1, fixed linear constrained curved 4 (189.6)
roaming-exemplar〈1〉 1, “roaming” linear arbitrary curved 1 (173.4)
striatal-pattern〈1〉 1, “roaming” piecewise-linear arbitrary piecewise-linear 1 (173.4)
all-exemplar N, fixed curved constrained curved 3 (178.7)
roaming-exemplar〈N〉 N, “roaming” curved arbitrary curved 5 (279.8)
N, number of training exemplars per category
AIC, Akaike Information Criterion (smaller value indicates better fit)
striatal pattern classifier, in addition to the models used in Experiment 1 (Table 3.2).
While the relationships among the all-exemplar, prototype, and linear boundary
models have been analyzed previously [Nosofsky, 1990, Ashby and Maddox, 1993,
Ashby and Alfonso-Reese, 1995], the improved model fits obtained with the RXM
and SPC in Experiment 2 afford new insights into the strengths and weaknesses of
previous models (see Figure 3.9 and Table 3.3 for an overview).
3.7.1 All-exemplar vs. prototype models
There are two significant differences between these models. First, in prototype
models, the stored exemplars are by construction defined as the arithmetic mean
in feature space of the training exemplars, while in all-exemplar models the stored
exemplars occupy other locations. Second, all-exemplar models allow more than
one stored exemplar per category, while prototype models allow only one, regard-
less of the number of training exemplars.
This second difference is linked with the question of category abstraction: stor-
age of a category prototype implies a more abstract representation than simple
memorization of all training exemplars. This places a higher burden on the learn-
ing process, since the system must select the correct abstraction, but makes post-
learning categorization more simple, since new exemplars have only to be com-
pared with the category prototypes. In contrast, all-exemplar models make the
opposite trade-off: since no abstraction is involved, learning is straightforward
as each training exemplar is simply packed away into memory, but post-learning
categorization is complicated since a new exemplar must be compared with ev-
ery stored exemplar in memory. While this requirement is not neurobiologically
unreasonable in typical psychophysical experiments which use few training ex-
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emplars per category, it seems less likely to be applicable to natural visual cate-
gories, which may contain thousands or more of exemplars. Furthermore, bio-
logical systems are likely to spend more time in using categories than in learning
them, at least for highly salient categories (e.g., male/female faces, poisonous/non-
poisonous fruit). Such arguments lend some a priori credence to the notion of a
prototype model, but are entirely hidden from statistical comparisons, since nei-
ther the contents of the memory nor the complexity of the learning process are free
parameters of the models. Indeed, past comparisons between all-exemplar and
prototype models have generated a preponderance of evidence favoring the all-
exemplar models.
When the contents of the memory locations become explicit free parameters,
questions concerning the importance of memory capacity can be addressed statis-
tically. For example, by comparing either the RXM〈1〉 or the equivalent SPC〈1〉
with a prototype model, we examine only the first difference mentioned above
between all-exemplar models and prototype models (whether memory traces are
fixed at the category mean). On the other hand, by comparing the RXM〈1〉 with the
RXM〈n〉 (n > 1) we examine only the second difference (changing the number of
stored exemplars). Our results from Experiment 2 (Table 3.2) demonstrate a large
improvement from allowing roaming, rather than fixed, stored exemplars (AIC:
RXM〈1〉, SPC〈1〉 = 173.4, prototype = 189.6), while allowing additional stored ex-
emplars actually leads to a decline in goodness-of-fit when the additional memory
is counted among the models’ free parameters (AIC: RXM〈10〉 = 271.9, RXM〈1〉
= 173.4). Thus, although the empirical success of all-exemplar models appears to
support a rejection of category abstraction, our results show that in fact we should
only reject the strict notion of abstraction involving category prototypes.
3.7.2 Prototype vs. linear boundary models
These two models are similar in that each has a decision boundary (i.e., the iso-
probability density surface where the categorization probability density equals 0.5)
that is a hyperplane in stimulus parameter space [Ashby and Maddox, 1993]. The
models also have two important differences. First, for prototype models, the de-
cision boundary must be orthogonal to the vector connecting the two category
prototypes in stimulus parameter space, while for linear boundary models, the
decision boundary can have an arbitrary orientation. Second, consider the iso-
probability density surfaces with p 6= 0.5: for the linear boundary model, these
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are hyperplanes parallel to the decision boundary, but for the prototype model,
these are paraboloid surfaces with a curvature that increases as p diverges from
0.5 (see Figure 3.9). Conceptually, this means that for the linear boundary model,
decision thresholds are the same at every point along the category boundary in
feature space, while for the prototype model, decision thresholds are narrowest
(i.e., the model is most confident) at the center of feature space, near the category
prototypes. Intuitively, the behavior of the prototype model seems more natural—
new objects are categorized more accurately when they are similar to previously
seen objects—but our results from Experiment 1 along with others’ results [e.g.,
Nosofsky, 1991] clearly contradict this intuition.
Again, a more flexible model can help to provide some insight into this issue.
In particular, the RXM〈1〉 and SPC〈1〉 are like the prototype model with curved,
rather than planar, iso-probability surfaces, but are like the linear boundary model
in that the main decision boundary can have an arbitrary orientation. Our re-
sults from Experiment 2 demonstrate that with these two qualities combined, the
RXM〈1〉 and SPC〈1〉 fit human behavior significantly better than either the proto-
type or linear boundary models (AIC: RXM〈1〉, SPC〈1〉 = 173.4, prototype = 189.6,
linear boundary = 177.3).
3.7.3 All-exemplar vs. linear boundary models
By extension of the previous two comparisons, the differences between the all-
exemplar model and the linear boundary model are even more numerous. The
all-exemplar model allows for curved decision surfaces, but the orientation of the
surface has limited flexibility. In contrast, the linear boundary model allows only
flat decision surfaces, but these may have arbitrary orientation. Again, the RXM
can combine the separate strengths of these two models.
In the RXM, the parameters which describe the stored exemplars become free
parameters of the model, and can be incorporated into comparisons among mod-
els using statistical measures such as the Akaike Information Criterion. This al-
lows us to address the importance of memory by comparing different versions of
the RXM with different numbers of stored exemplars. With this framework, we
can now provide a better answer as to why models which are otherwise appeal-
ing in their conceptual simplicity, such as prototype models, are consistently out-
performed by all-exemplar models: all-exemplar models allow better flexibility in
matching the shape and orientation of decision surfaces to those used by human
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observers. Our results show that the goodness-of-fit of all-exemplar models can
be improved upon by allowing “roaming” stored exemplars, and thus an uncon-
strained decision boundary, without committing to high memory demands or to a
lack of category-level abstraction.
3.7.4 RXM vs. SPC
Computationally, the RXM and SPC are quite similar to each other, as well as to
several earlier models (Anderson, 1991, Kruschke, 1992; see also Ashby and Wal-
dron 1999), in that they each rely on a set of units representing locations in feature
space, and categorize new inputs based on the distance in feature space between
the input and the various stored units. The main qualitative difference is at the
decision stage, where the RXM produces smoothly curved decision boundaries,
while the SPC produces piecewise-linear decision boundaries. This is because
in the RXM, the categorization decision is based on contributions from all of the
stored units, with weights proportional to the distance of the stored units from the
input, while in the SPC, only the nearest stored unit of each category is considered.
In this sense, the SPC involves a much stronger nonlinearity than the RXM. This
sharp nonlinearity may not be strictly implemented in neural circuitry; rather, a bi-
ological implementation might have to rely on a “softmax” approximation [Riesen-
huber and Poggio, 1999] which would more closely resemble a gradual decay of
similarity with distance as in the RXM. This question remains to be resolved by
further neurophysiological study.
Despite the computational similarities of the SPC and RXM, each is derived
from previous models whose neurobiological implications may appear to put the
two models at odds. We have proposed the RXM as a generalization of prototype
models and all-exemplar models (i.e., GCM). All-exemplar models, which propose
one hidden unit for every training exemplar, have in particular carried the impli-
cation that observers may rely on explicit memory of individual visual stimuli,
and that the models’ hidden units correspond to these memory traces [e.g., Knowl-
ton, 1999]. This stands in contrast to neuropsychological evidence from patients
with amnesia who, despite an impairment in recognition tasks requiring declara-
tive memory of individual exemplars, are relatively unimpaired in various tasks
requiring category learning [Knowlton and Squire, 1993, Squire and Knowlton,
1995, Filoteo et al., 2001]. For this reason, Ashby and Waldron [1999] proposed
that the striatal units in the SPC are primarily response-associated; that is, the
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units are primarily involved in decision, rather than perception. We do not make
any claims regarding whether the hidden units in the RXM are essentially explicit
memory traces, particularly since the hidden units are allowed to occupy points
in feature space that were never directly related to a training exemplar. However,
electrophysiogical evidence does suggest that the mechanisms that are shaped dur-
ing category learning also affect perception. Sigala and Logothetis [2002] showed
that, after category learning, inferotemporal neurons in the macaque were more
sensitive to features that were diagnostic of category membership than to non-
diagnostic features (although Ashby and Ell [2001] reviewed studies in which ex-
posure to visual stimuli that were associated with non-visual categories such as
good/bad tastes did not lead to a change in visual cell response properties). Fur-
thermore, behavioral data (MDS) showed that monkeys’ perception also shifts as
a result of category training [Sigala et al., 2002], supporting the idea that the hid-
den units tuned to specific features in a categorization model may not operate
solely at the decision stage, but may also be directly involved in perception. This
is not incompatible with the evidence from amnesic patients; it may be that cat-
egorization relies on neural representations that are explicit in the sense of being
discrete and minimally distributed, but do not constitute “explicit memory” in the
sense of being behaviorally accessible for declarative memory. In any case, current
psychophysical evidence alone cannot discriminate whether a model’s mathemat-
ical constructs correspond to neuronal processes occurring in specific cortical areas
such as the striatum, inferotemporal cortex, or even prefrontal cortex.
3.7.5 Generalization and learning
In the most general terms, categorization is a process with four components: (1) ex-
ternal input (visual stimuli), (2) internal input (pre-existing memories and neural
state), and (3) a mechanism that combines the inputs to produce (4) an observ-
able output (categorization behavior). A complete theory of categorization should
quantitatively describe an internal mechanism that can be appropriately tuned by
a learning process involving exposure to a limited set of training exemplars [e.g.,
Nosofsky et al., 1992, Ashby and Ell, 2001], and should describe how differences
in observers’ pre-existing internal states lead to different categorization behavior
given the same input. In the context of the RXM or SPC, for example, such a theory
might help address questions such as how the number of hidden units is adjusted
during learning, perhaps in relation to the difficulty in separating categories from
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one another.
By this standard, the models we have discussed provide only a partial theory,
in that they only describe the fully-trained mechanism without offering a process
for learning the tunable parameters of that mechanism. We have inferred the final
values of these parameters by fitting the models to human behavior on a set of test
exemplars4. In other words, by collecting and modeling observers’ responses to
the test exemplars, we have only addressed the question of what did observers learn,
rather than the more complex question of how did they learn it. Nevertheless, our
descriptive results provide valuable constraints for more complete future models
of the learning process; after all, a model cannot successfully describe the learning
process without also successfully describing the outcome of that process.
4An alternate approach would be to fit the models to match observers’ performance on the
training set, and then judge the models based on observers’ performance on the test set. But our
observers were trained to be highly accurate in categorizing the training set (with most categoriza-
tion probabilities near 0 or 1), so their training-set performance places only very weak constraints
on the models, since all of the models can be trivially fitted to classify the training set with 100%
accuracy. In contrast, we designed the test exemplars for the express purpose of being potentially
ambiguous, so that observers’ test-set performance would place strong constraints on the models
being fitted.
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Figure 3.9. An illustration of the type of decision surfaces predicted by the various models.
Each column summarizes the behavior of one of the model types. The top row repro-
duces the schematic diagrams of the models from Figure 3.8. The next rows summarize
some of the qualitative features of each model. Finally, the bottom rows show the de-
cision surfaces that resulted when each model was fitted to one subjects’ categorization
behavior (one subject per row). Each of the contour lines through these plots represents
an iso-probability contour, along which the model predicts a constant categorization prob-
ability. Nine consecutive iso-probability contours are shown for category 1 probabilities of
10–90%. The central iso-probability contour represents the main decision boundary, or
equivocation point, where the model predicts that the subject would be equally likely to
categorize a stimulus into either category 1 or category 2. Note how the different models
produce iso-probability contours with different characteristic shapes.
CHAPTER 4
Multidimensional Scaling
4.1 Introduction
Current categorization models in the psychological literature, such as those pre-
sented in the previous chapter, typically depend on high-level multidimensional
representations of incoming stimuli [Ashby, 1992b, Ashby and Maddox, 1993].
Edelman [1999] reviewed evidence suggesting that such representations are in-
timately linked with the perceptual similarity of stimuli. A common technique
used to infer implicit psychological representations is to apply multidimensional
scaling (MDS) to observers’ judgments of similarity about a set of stimuli. Presently,
the link between these psychophysical measures of similarity and the neuronal
mechanisms underlying stimulus representation in the primate visual system re-
mains poorly understood. A number of new approaches, including functional
brain imaging in humans [Edelman, Grill-Spector, Kushnir, and Malach, 1998] and
electrophysiological recordings in trained macaque monkeys [Op de Beeck et al.,
2001, Sigala and Logothetis, 2002] are likely to shed light on these issues. Some
of the methods are only applicable to one species, yet we would ultimately like
to draw conclusions that generalize (at least to higher primates); therefore a final
understanding must rely on comparisons between inferred psychological repre-
sentations in monkey and human observers. Since it is nearly impossible to train
animals to give graded similarity ratings between pairs of objects (the common
method in human studies), animal studies must rely on simpler two-alternative
forced choice methods instead. Our aim therefore is to directly compare these two
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ways of rating object similarity directly in human subjects, with the goal of estab-
lishing a link that can support future cross-species comparisons.
4.2 Similarity tasks
Two different similarity tasks (pairs and triads tasks, see Figure 4.1) were per-
formed with the 20-object configurations used in Experiment 1 from Section 3.2
(Figure 3.1). For each configuration, subjects’ psychophysical responses were used
to form a 20 × 20 experimental dissimilarity matrix with entries δij, using a proce-
dure specific to the task (see descriptions below). This matrix was then used to
estimate subjects’ psychological representations of the stimuli (see Section 4.3).
4.2.1 Pairs task
In the pairwise comparison task [Borg and Groenen, 1997, ch. 6.2], or pairs task
(Figure 4.1a), subjects viewed sequences of simultaneously presented pairs of ob-
jects. Each pair was presented for 2 s, followed by 2 s of blank screen. Subjects
could respond at any time during that 4 s interval with a button press between 1–
9, indicating how similar the objects appeared. Subjects were instructed to choose
“9” if and only if the two objects were identical. Each of the 400 possible pairings of
the 20 objects was presented 3 times throughout the experiment, giving 1200 total
trials. For each pair of objects xi and xj, the dissimilarity matrix entry δij was taken
to be 9 − s¯ij, where s¯ij is the average similarity rating over the n trials containing
objects i and j, with n = 3 for i = j, n = 6 for i 6= j because pairings with distinct
objects were shown three times for each of the two possible orderings (xi, xj) and
(xj, xi).
As a measure of the consistency with which subjects rated the pairs, we used
a triangle inequality test. For each triplet of objects (xi, xj, xk), we considered the
three corresponding pairwise ratings given by a subject, s¯ij, s¯ik, and s¯jk. A strict
triangle inequality rule would require
s¯ij + s¯ik > s¯jk
s¯ij + s¯jk > s¯ik
s¯ik + s¯jk > s¯ij
However, to allow for the possibility that subjects might place different objects at
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(a) pairs task
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
similar?dissimilar?
(b) triads task
left pair
more similar?
right pair
more similar?
Figure 4.1. The two psychophysical tasks shown here were used to acquire similarity data
that could drive a multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis. In the pairs task (a), subjects
viewed successive pairs of objects on a computer screen. After each pair, the subject
was required to respond with a rating from 1 to 9 indicating how similar the two objects
seemed to each other, with 9 meaning “identical.” In the triads task (b), subjects viewed
successive triads of objects; for each triad, subjects were required to indicate whether
the left or right pair seemed more similar. The triads task, but not the pairs task, can be
learned by monkeys, while human subjects prefer the pairs task since it requires fewer
trials. With either task, the raw data are transformed into a dissimilarity matrix whose
entries indicate the perceived dissimilarity between each pair of objects; this matrix is then
used to guide the construction of a low-dimensional representational space for the objects
such that the inter-object Euclidean distances in this space correlate well with the observed
dissimilarities.
identical locations in perceptual space, we tested a relaxed triangle inequality rule:
s¯ij + s¯ik ≥ s¯jk
s¯ij + s¯jk ≥ s¯ik
s¯ik + s¯jk ≥ s¯ij
Across 20 pairs task experiments, with 1540 possible triangles per experiment, we
found that 96.05% (29583 of 30800) satisfied this relaxed triangle inequality. On the
other hand, 91.43% (28160 of 30800) satisfied the strict inequality.
4.2.2 Triads task
The triads task (Figure 4.1b), a variant of the anchor stimulus method [Borg and
Groenen, 1997, ch. 6.2], is a two-alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) task, and as
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such it has been particularly useful for studies involving non-verbal observers (e.g.,
human infants, Arabie, Kosslyn, and Nelson, 1975; monkeys, Sigala et al., 2002).
Subjects viewed sequences of simultaneously presented triads of objects, arrayed
horizontally. Each triad (x1, x2, x3) was presented for 2 s, followed by 2 s of blank
screen. Subjects could respond at any time during that 4 s trial with a button press
indicating whether the left pair (x1, x2) or the right pair (x2, x3) appeared more
similar. Time constraints prohibited using all possible triad combinations. Instead,
the 6840 possible triads (xi, xj, xk) of the 20 objects were sorted by the Euclidean
distance in stimulus parameter space between the leftmost and rightmost stimuli
(d(xi, xk)), and the 1710 triads with the largest such distances were used for psy-
chophysics. Finally, subjects’ binary responses in the triads task were transformed
into analog dissimilarities δij using a procedure described in Sigala et al. [2002].
4.3 MDS analysis
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used to find a set
Xˆ = {xˆ1, . . . , xˆN}
of N 4-D vectors xˆi, that best reflected the internal psychological representation
used by a subject when performing a similarity task1. The best such representation
is found by minimizing the stress σ,
σ =
1
2 ∑i,j
(d(xˆi, xˆj)− δij)2,
where d is the Euclidean distance and δij are the dissimilarities computed from
subjects’ responses in one of the similarity tasks. These representations allow for
a clear correspondence between the scaled dimensions and the physical stimulus
parameters, as follows.
To align the MDS configuration Xˆ with the original configuration X , we used
an isometric Procrustes transformation P, consisting of a rigid rotation, translation,
and uniform scaling [Borg and Groenen, 1997, ch. 19]. The optimal Procrustes
1Note that this procedure deviates from a strict definition of MDS because the dimensionality
of the representation space was fixed to 4, rather than being a free parameter. However, previous
studies using have obtained satisfactory MDS solutions with 4-D representations Brunswik faces
[Nosofsky, 1991] and fish stimuli [Sigala et al., 2002].
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transformation Pmin minimizes the loss function
L(P) = ∑
i
d2(xi, P(xˆi)).
This minimum value L(Pmin), called the residual squared distance (RSD), quantifies
the dissimilarity between subjects’ psychological representation Xˆ and the original
stimulus configuration X .
To determine whether the observed RSDs were smaller than would be expected
by chance, a Monte Carlo technique was used. RSDs were computed between
the original configuration and 105 random configurations whose parameters were
drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. The resulting distribution was used
to estimate the significance levels of the RSDs of the pairs and triads MDS config-
urations.
4.4 MDS results
In order to quantify the goodness of fit between subjects’ Procrustes-transformed
MDS configurations and the original stimulus configuration, we used Monte Carlo
simulations comparing the residual squared distances (RSDs) of our subjects’ MDS
configurations with the RSDs of random configurations (see Figure 4.2a). Fig-
ure 4.3 shows the alignment between one example original stimulus configuration
and the corresponding Procrustes-transforms for each of
• a random configuration from the Monte Carlo simulation,
• an MDS configuration derived from the triads task, and
• an MDS configuration derived from the pairs task.
The mean of the pairs-MDS distribution (0.1444) was roughly twice as close to the
original configuration as would be expected by chance (0.3268), and all pairs-MDS
configurations were significantly closer (p < 0.005) to the original configuration
than were the random configurations. Likewise, the triads-MDS configurations
were also all significantly closer to the original space than would be expected by
chance (p < 0.005), although the mean of the triads-MDS distribution (0.1982) was
not as close to the original configuration as was the pairs-MDS distribution. A
paired t-test showed that the residual squared distances of the pairs-MDS config-
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Figure 4.2. A summary the MDS configurations obtained with pairs and triads similarity
tasks. (a) As measured with the residual squared distance (RSD), all of the pairs-MDS
and triads-MDS configurations were significantly more similar (p < 0.005) to the origi-
nal configuration of stimulus parameter values than would be expected by chance. The
distribution of RSDs for 105 random configurations (gray bars, arrows with p-values) was
compared with the RSDs for 10 subjects’ pairs-MDS (upper, solid lines) and triads-MDS
(lower, dashed lines) configurations. Two identical configurations would give an RSD of
0, while two unrelated configurations would give an RSD near the median of the random
distribution (0.33). The RSDs for pairs-MDS were significantly smaller than those for triads-
MDS (p < 0.05). (b) To directly compare the similarity judgments obtained in the pairs and
triads tasks, we computed two metrics for triads of objects (x1, x2, x3): (1) the difference
D = S(x2, x3) − S(x1, x2) of two similarity ratings given in the pairs task, and (2) among
triads with similar values of D, the fraction F of trials in which the observer chose (x2, x3)
as more similar than (x1, x2) when viewing (x1, x2, x3) in the triads task. The two measures
D and F were highly correlated (ρ = 0.9946) across 10 subjects.
urations were significantly smaller than those of the triads-MDS configurations
(p < 0.05).
To further assess the relationship between these two methods for obtaining sim-
ilarity judgments, we performed a more direct comparison, using subjects’ raw re-
sponses rather than the derived MDS configurations (Figure 4.2b). In each trial in
the triads task, subjects viewed three objects (x1, x2, x3) and compared the similari-
ties of the two pairs (x1, x2) and (x2, x3). Subjects also directly rated the similarities
of these pairs in the pairs task. Thus, for each triad (x1, x2, x3) which was shown
in the triads task, we computed Dpairs, the difference between the similarity rat-
ings given by the subjects in the pairs task to the pairs (x1, x2) and (x2, x3). We then
split the triads trials into groups with similar values of Dpairs. Within each group
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Figure 4.3. Shown here is the alignment between the original stimulus configuration and
MDS configurations for one sample set of Brunswik faces. The location of each Brunswik
face within the original stimulus configuration is given by a pair of points, one in each of
a pair of plots, with two of its feature values indicated in the left plot (eye height and eye
separation), and the other two feature values indicated in the right plot (nose length and
mouth height). Each pair of plots shows the relationship between the original stimulus
values () and the feature values derived from MDS; a thin line is shown connecting these
alternate representations for each Brunswik face. (a) The alternate representation here
(∗) is actually a configuration in which each feature value was assigned randomly, and the
resulting configuration was then aligned as best as possible to the original configuration
with a Procrustes transformation. (b) Here, the alternate representation (N) is derived via
MDS from one subject’s responses in the triads task, and the resulting configuration is
again Procrustes-transformed to match the original configuration as best as possible. (c)
Finally, here the alternate representation (•) is derived via MDS from the same subject’s
responses in the pairs task. In the examples shown here, the apparent trend is that the
pairs-MDS configuration is more similar to the original than is the triads-MDS configuration,
which in turn is more similar to the original than is the random configuration. In fact, this
trend carries over to the overall results shown in Figure 4.2.
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we computed Ftriads, the fraction of trials for which the subject chose the right pair
as more similar than the left pair in the triads task. These two measures Dpairs and
Ftriads were highly correlated in data obtained from single subjects (ρ > 0.98 for 9 of
10 subjects) and when data were pooled across subjects (ρ = 0.9946; Figure 4.2b).
Finally, for each of the models tested in Experiment 1 (Chapter 3), we re-fitted
the model using the pairs- and triads-derived MDS configurations in place of the
original stimulus configurations. Thus another indicator of the relationship be-
tween the psychophysical (i.e., MDS) and physical features is given by the relation-
ship between the goodness of fit of models fitted with those two sets of features.
Measured by the % of variance explained, both the MDS-pairs and MDS-triads
model fits were strongly correlated with the fits obtained using the original config-
uration, as well as with each other (ρ > 0.90 in each case). The average goodness
of fit of the MDS-pairs models lagged behind that of the original models by 2.3
%-variance, and the MDS-triads models lagged by an additional 5.5 %-variance.
Figure 4.4 shows these relationships for the MDS-pairs configurations.
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
% variance
model based on original configuration
%
 v
a
ri
a
n
c
e
m
o
d
e
l 
b
a
s
e
d
 o
n
 M
D
S
-p
a
ir
s
 c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
-17.5 -12.5 -7.5 -2.5 2.5 7.5 12.5 17.5
(orig % var) - (MDS % var)
fr
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
(a) (b)
Figure 4.4. (a) A scatter plot showing the relationship between the goodness of fit (% of
variance explained) of categorization models based on the original stimulus configurations
(i.e., the physical feature values like eye height and eye separation) and the fit of models
based on the MDS configurations derived from subjects’ responses in the pairs task. The
dashed diagonal line indicates where the two fits would be equal; it can be seen that
the majority of the points fall just below this line, indicating that the models based on the
original configurations fit slightly better than those based on the MDS configurations. This
trend is seen more explicitly in (b), which shows a histogram of the paired differences in the
goodness of fit between the two types of model. In the majority of cases, the model based
on the original configuration has a 2.5% advantage in %-variance over the MDS-based
model.
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4.5 Discussion
Several authors [Shepard, 1987, Edelman, 1999] have proposed that neural mech-
anisms of representation are based on similarity. Similarity measures can be trans-
formed to feature space representations with multidimensional scaling, a tech-
nique that has often been used as the basis for models of categorization and recog-
nition [e.g., Nosofsky, 1986]. Yet, only recently has the neurobiological validity
of MDS begun to be investigated directly with monkey electrophysiology [Op de
Beeck et al., 2001, Sigala and Logothetis, 2002] and human fMRI [Edelman et al.,
1998]. Given the practical significance of comparing results obtained in monkey
and human studies, it is important to establish the compatibility of the behavioral
methods used for the two species. Because it is impossible for monkey observers
(as well as for human infants; e.g., Arabie et al., 1975, Sloutsky and Lo, 1999) to
give an analog similarity rating, a task based on binary choice such as the “triads”
task must be used instead2. Unfortunately, since each triads trial conveys only rel-
ative information about pairwise similarities, the entire task requires many trials
and is quite time demanding. Thus, adult human subjects prefer the “pairs” task,
which is is based on analog similarity judgments, and is less time demanding since
each trial directly conveys absolute information about pairwise similarities. There-
fore, we compared the results of the pairs and triads tasks within a set of human
subjects to assess their equivalence in characterizing psychophysical representa-
tions of similarity. As Figure 4.2b shows, the judgments obtained in theses two
tasks were highly correlated, suggesting that a shared process could account for
subjects’ performance in both tasks. These results legitimize comparisons between
data from the pairs task in human subjects and data from the triads task in monkey
subjects.
One purpose of the MDS analysis is to construct an input representation for the
categorization models that can be tested independently of the original stimulus
configuration. We found that model fits did not improve when the models were
based on pairs-MDS or triads-MDS configurations, relative to the original stimu-
lus configuration (Figure 4.4). This result agrees with the findings of Sigala et al.
[2002] using both monkey and human subjects in experiments similar to those re-
ported here. Thus, although some models (such as the GCM; Nosofsky, 1986, 1991)
have originally been used exclusively with MDS configurations, we found that
2Alternatively, a same/different task can be used to generate a confusion matrix for MDS [Sug-
ihara, Edelman, and Tanaka, 1998].
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they achieve similar performance when the original configuration is used instead.
We interpret these results to mean that subjects can efficiently learn a psychological
representation that is highly similar to the native representation of a set of objects.
The mechanism for this learning process remains a subject for future investigation,
and the next chapter explores one model of early vision for extracting such a rep-
resentation directly, starting with the visual input at the retina. In any case, the
empirical correlation between the original and MDS configurations is of practical
relevance because the MDS procedure is time-intensive both in the collection of
similarity task data and in the computational analysis of those data. Our results
suggest that this analysis step can be bypassed without affecting the comparison
of various classification models.
CHAPTER 5
Early vision in categorization
In a biological system, any high-level representation must be built from lower-level
representations, and in vision this means that all representations must ultimately
trace back to the retinal input. Many categorization models presuppose that the
high-level (external) features used by the experimenter to define the objects are
the same as those used internally by the observer when making a categorization
decision. For example, many categorization studies have used a set of circles with
bisecting lines, defined by two features: the diameter of the circle, and the angle
of the bisecting line (see Figure 2.1). This approach has certainly been fruitful, and
MDS studies (Chapter 4) have demonstrated strong similarities between the ex-
ternal and internal feature representations. Nevertheless, apparent irregularities
in the categorization process that might be inexplicable in terms of high-level rep-
resentations, could appear entirely natural in the light of biological early vision.
At the least, features such as angle of the bisecting line are not likely to be repre-
sented explicitly by neurons involved in visual perception; rather, a population of
neurons might form a distributed representation, in which each neuron responds
preferentially to a single range of orientations. Whether such differences have an
effect on the output of categorization models is an empirical question. We have
tested a set of hybrid models, in which we adapted a hierarchical model of early
vision model (“HMAX”) based on Riesenhuber and Poggio [1999]. HMAX op-
erates directly in image space, in contrast to the categorization models described
above, which operate in feature space. Our approach was to extract a new feature
space representation from the output of HMAX, which could then be used as an
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alternate input for fitting the categorization models, to be compared with model
fits obtained using the original physical feature space.
5.1 HMAX: a model of early vision
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Figure 5.1. Shown here is a schematic depiction of the “HMAX” model of early vision
[Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999]. The workings of the model progress from left to right
in this diagram. First, an input image is filtered with overlapping orientation-tuned linear
filters at multiple orientations and spatial scales. After additive pooling over small regions
of spatial locations, these filter outputs form the S1 layer responses (next column). Next,
the outputs from the S1 layer are pooled over spatial locations and spatial scale bands,
this time using a max operation, to form the C1 layer. In the next step, more complex
features are formed, in which units in the S2 layer respond to different spatial arrangements
of oriented edges. Finally, the C2 layer is formed by pooling S2 responses over spatial
locations and spatial scale bands. In the original model, C2 cells pooled over all spatial
locations and all scale bands; however, in our modified model (see Figure 5.5) the C2 cells
pooled only over coarse sub-regions of the entire image.
In brief (see Figure 5.1), HMAX operates through two stages of “simple” and
“complex” units (S1, C1, S2, and C2). The S1 representation (see Figure 5.2 for an
example) is obtained by filtering the image with a bank of Gabor-like filters tuned
for multiple orientations and spatial scales. The C1 representation (Figure 5.2) is
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Figure 5.2. Responses from the S1 and C1 layers of a modified HMAX model operating
on a single Brunswik face. Each image represents the responses of a set of units tuned to
one of two orientations and one of four spatial scales; each column represents one of the
possible orientations, and each row represents one of the possible spatial scales. The S1
responses are the immediate result of linear filtering, while the C1 responses are drawn
from the S1 responses by pooling over spatial location and spatial scale using the max
operator.
produced by pooling the activations of S1 units at neighboring spatial locations
and across similar spatial scales. At the S2 level (Figure 5.3) more complex features
are formed by pooling the activations of a 2 × 2 spatial array of neighboring C1
units tuned to specific orientations; in this way, different S2 units begin to represent
features such as “elongated contour” or “corner” or “disk.” Finally, each C2 unit
pools across S2 units tuned to the same feature type, but at different spatial scales
and/or spatial locations (Figure 5.4).
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S2 responses
scale 1scale 0
scale 3scale 2
Figure 5.3. Responses from the S2 layer of a modified HMAX model operating on a single
Brunswik face. Each group of images represents one of the four spatial scale bands; each
of the 16 images within each group represents the responses of a batch of S2 units tuned
to one of the 16 possible complex features (see Figure 5.5) formed by combinations of
neighboring C1 units.
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Figure 5.4. Each of the 12 subplots shown here represents one of the 80-member
Brunswik face illustrated in Figure 3.7. Each point represents the response magnitude
(given by grayscale value) of a C2 unit (numbered 1 to 576 along the y axes), for a given
Brunswik face (numbered 1 to 80 along the x axes). Notice that the plots show strong
horizontal “streaks,” reflecting the fact that the responses of many of the C2 units are es-
sentially invariant to the identity of the Brunswik face. As a result, the space of C2 units
has a high redundancy, and can be efficiently transformed into a lower-dimensional repre-
sentation as shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9.
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• 16 feature types at S2/C2 level
• each at 4 spatial scales
• 16 coarse spatial maps
• each map at 6x6 resolution
• 16x6x6 = 576 C2 cells
• PCA dimensionality reduction
• best 4 principal components
  recover ~80% of the variance
• 2 orientations at S1/C1 level
• 4 spatial scales
(a) (c)
(d)
(b)
Figure 5.5. Shown here is a summary of the changes in our modified HMAX model,
relative to the original model introduced by Riesenhuber and Poggio [1999] illustrated in
Figure 5.1. (a) Only two orientations of linear filters, rather than four, were used at the
S1/C1 level. These were found to be sufficient to represent the simple line-drawn stimuli
under study. (b) With only two orientations, there were only 16 complex feature types at
the S2/C2 level, rather than 256. (c) Rather than pooling over the entire image space, each
C2 unit had a receptive field of 1/6 the length of the image, so that there were 36 C2 units
for each of the 16 complex feature types. (d) In order to reduce the dimensionality of the
output, principal component analysis (PCA) was applied to the 576 C2 units, and only the
principal components corresponding to the 4 largest eigenvalues were selected for further
use.
5.2 Modifications to HMAX
We made several modifications relative to the original model of Riesenhuber and
Poggio [1999] (see Figure 5.5); these modifications were guided by the goal of in-
creasing the variance of the HMAX outputs across the set of input images, so as to
provide a rich but compact foundation for a subsequent categorization stage. First,
instead of each C2 unit pooling across the entire image space, we subdivided the
image into a 6× 6 grid, with each C2 unit responding only to one of the 36 subre-
gions. This increased granularity allowed the model to extract features that were
more relevant as input to the categorization models. In addition, we restricted the
number of orientation filters among the S1 units from four to two (i.e., just hori-
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zontal and vertical). This retained the model’s ability to represent the variability
among the simple schematic input images, but at the same time significantly re-
duced the dimensionality of the output space: since each S2/C2 feature type rep-
resented a four-part configuration of two possible S1/C1 orientations, there were
24 = 16 S2/C2 feature types (rather than 44 = 256 as in the original model). With
36 spatial locations, this gave a total of 36× 16 = 576 C2 units.
5.3 C2 responses vs. the original representation
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Figure 5.6. Each of the 12 subplots shown here represents one of the 80-member
Brunswik face illustrated in Figure 3.7. Each point represents the correlation strength be-
tween one of the C2 units (numbered 1 to 576 along the x axes) with one of the parameters
of the Brunswik faces (along the y axes). Abbreviations: id, identification number of the
face within its containing set (i.e., numbered 1 to 80); categ, the category identity of the
face (i.e., 1 or 2); eh, es, nl, mh: eye height, eye separation, nose length and mouth height.
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Figure 5.7. Shown here are the responses of several C2 units and the Brunswik face
physical parameters between which there were strong correlations (i.e., these are the units
represented by bright white points in Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6 shows how each of these 576 C2 units correlated with the features of
interest in the Brunswik face sets from Figure 3.7. Many of the C2 units showed
strong correlations with at least one of the original physical parameters of the
Brunswik faces (EH: ρ = 0.93, ES: ρ = 0.91, NL: ρ = 0.95, MH: ρ = 0.998). The
responses profiles of several such units are shown in detail in Figure 5.7. Notably,
none of the C2 units showed a strong direct correlation with the category mem-
bership of the faces, emphasizing the need for a multi-stage categorization process
in which a further categorization mechanism (like those described in Chapter 3)
operates on an intermediate representation, perhaps similar to the one produced
by the modified HMAX model.
In order to test how well the C2 output space of the modified HMAX model
captured the variability in the input space of Brunswik faces, we performed the
following test for each of the 12 stimulus configurations from Figure 3.7. First, we
computed the variance in the output of each C2 unit across the set of the 80 in-
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Figure 5.8. Each of the 12 subplots shown here represents one of the 80-member
Brunswik face illustrated in Figure 3.7. Plotted here are the correlations between pairwise
distances computed in the original parameter space and pairwise distances computed us-
ing the N C2 units with highest variance, where N increases along the x axes.
put stimuli, and sorted the C2 units from highest to lowest variance; presumably
the units with highest variance are those that can best discriminate among the dif-
ferent input stimuli. Then, for varying N, we selected the N units with highest
variance, forming an N-dimensional representation for each Brunswik face, and
computed the pairwise Euclidean distances in this N-dimensional space between
all possible pairs of faces. Finally, we computed the correlation across all pairs be-
tween these distances and the analogous distances obtained by using the original
four-dimensional representation of the physical parameters (eye height, eye sepa-
ration, nose length, mouth height). Figure 5.8 shows how these correlations vary
as a function of N. Two numbers are of interest. First is the maximum possible cor-
relation, regardless of N; this indicates how faithfully the full complement of C2
units capture the variability in the input space. This correlation was ≥ 0.8 for all
of the 12 configurations. The second number of interest is how small of an N can
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be used while still retaining an “acceptable” level of correlation between the two
spaces. Since the original space was just four-dimensional, in principle an ideal
intermediate representation would only need N = 4. In the case of the modified
HMAX model, we found that the correlation values were ≈ 0.6 when only the first
4 C2 units with highest variance were selected.
5.4 PCA with C2 responses
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Figure 5.9. Each of the 12 subplots shown here represents one of the 80-member
Brunswik face illustrated in Figure 3.7. Plotted here are the correlations between pairwise
distances computed in the original parameter space and pairwise distances computed us-
ing the N PCA principal components (derived from C2 units) with highest eigenvalues,
where N increases along the x axes. Note that the correlations here increase more quickly
as a function of N than in Figure 5.8.
Since a significant amount of accuracy was lost by using only the first 4 of 576
C2 units with highest variance, we used principal component analysis (PCA) ap-
plied to the C2 units to retain the highest fidelity in as compact a representation
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Figure 5.10. Shown here is the four-dimensional representation of one set of Brunswik
faces obtained by selecting the first 4 principal components with highest eigenvalues de-
rived with PCA from the C2 units. The two face categories are represented by × and ◦
in the plots. Note that the categories are nearly linearly separable in the projection onto
dimensions 2 and 3.
as possible. Figure 5.9, like Figure 5.8, shows the correlations between pairwise
distances as a function of the dimensionality of the representation, except that in
this case the basis units of the representation are the principal components from
PCA rather than the raw C2 units. Since PCA adds no new information, but only
reshuffles existing information for optimal efficiency, we find that the maximum
values in Figure 5.9 are the same as in Figure 5.81: around 0.8 for each of the 12 sets.
On the other hand we find that correlations approach this maximum much more
quickly as a function of N, the number of principal components included. In gen-
eral, we found that > 95% of the maximum correlation could be recovered with the
first 50 of the 576 principal components, and ≈ 80% of the maximum correlation
was obtained with only the first 4 components. Therefore, for comparison with the
1Modulo rounding errors due to the limited accuracy of discrete floating-point arithmetic.
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four-dimensional physical parameter configurations, we used the first 4 principal
components from the modified-HMAX C2 activations to test how well the catego-
rization models would fare with a biologically plausible input derived from the
image space representation of the stimuli. Figure 5.10 shows the four-dimensional
PCA configuration obtained for one of the 12 sets of Brunswik faces.
5.5 Categorization models using HMAX
Table 5.1. Goodness-of-fit of the models tested in Experiment 2. See also Table 3.3 for
further discussion of the models’ qualitative properties.
RXM〈1〉 RXM〈2〉 RXM〈3〉 SPC〈1〉 SPC〈2〉 SPC〈3〉 GCM PBI WPSM
% var [orig] 89.36∗ 90.98∗ 91.49 89.36∗ 90.83∗ 91.64 86.84∗ 87.10∗ 84.90∗
− ln L [orig] 75.72∗ 72.06∗ 71.32∗ 75.72∗ 71.65∗ 69.92 83.41∗ 83.66∗ 88.79∗
AIC [orig] 173.44 178.13∗ 188.64∗ 173.44 177.30∗ 185.84∗ 178.81∗ 177.32 189.57∗
% var [HMAX] 80.96∗ 83.98∗ 85.00∗ 80.96∗ 84.54∗ 85.99 75.62∗ 78.57∗ 72.57∗
− ln L [HMAX] 91.24∗ 84.38∗ 81.89∗ 91.24∗ 82.77∗ 78.11 111.92∗ 97.70∗ 118.19∗
AIC [HMAX] 204.48∗ 202.76∗ 209.78∗ 204.48∗ 199.55 202.23∗ 235.85∗ 205.40∗ 248.37∗
% var, % of variance explained by model (larger value indicated better fit)
− ln L, minus loglikelihood (smaller value indicates better fit)
AIC, Akaike Information Criterion (smaller value indicates better fit)
orig, models were fitted using objects represented by the original stimulus parameters, as in Chapter3
HMAX, models were fitted using objects represented by features derived from a feed-forward early-vision network
bold numbers, model(s) which gave the best fit in each row
∗, models whose fits were significantly worse (p < 0.05) than the best-fitting model in each row
Each of the models from Chapter 3 was re-fitted using the four-dimensional
representations derived via PCA from the C2 activations of the HMAX model, and
compared with models fitted using original physical parameters of the stimuli.
Among the HMAX-based models, the SPC and RXM again gave better fits than
the other models (see Table 5.1, rows 4–6). As before, the uncorrected measures
(minus loglikelihood and %-variance) improved as the number of stored exem-
plars increased, with the best overall fit given by the SPC〈3〉. In contrast to the fits
based on the physical parameters, the best AIC values were obtained with 2 (rather
than 1) stored exemplars per category for both the SPC and RXM, although as be-
fore fits decreased again with more than 2 stored exemplars. Overall, the HMAX-
based model fits were significantly poorer than the corresponding fits based on the
physical parameters. Nevertheless, the absolute difference between the best-fitting
HMAX-based and physical parameter-based models was only 5.6 %-variance.
With these results, we have begun to ground high-level models of categoriza-
tion more firmly in neurobiology by combining them with an early vision model
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(HMAX; Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999) that encapsulates the processes that func-
tionally precede object categorization in the visual system. Unlike the original
categorization models which receive a high-level feature based description of their
input, these hybrid models operate directly on a pixel-based image space repre-
sentation of the input. Although the hybrid models fit relatively poorly when
compared with the original models, their absolute performance is encouraging.
The best-fitting HMAX-SPC〈3〉 model was able to account for nearly 86% of the
variance seen in subjects’ responses. If anything, our results underestimate the
capabilities of a hybrid model, since we used only the first 4 of 576 principal com-
ponent vectors of the raw HMAX output, sacrificing ≈ 20% of the available vari-
ance. This performance was achieved using straightforward bottom-up processing
of the input images, with no task-specific training or context-specific top-down
modulation of the early vision stage. Yet, such top-down effects are certainly in-
volved in the performance of human subjects, and the original high-level features
are indeed a close approximation of subjects’ internal representations as shown by
MDS experiments. It thus appears that current high-level models of categoriza-
tion can be linked to more detailed biological models of vision. A better integra-
tion of early-vision and object-categorization models—for example, by allowing
attentional weights to propagate from the decision stage back to earlier sensory
levels—is likely to uncover a more complete picture of the categorization process.
An open question is to what extent these computational insights, based on psy-
chophysical experiments using simple, four-feature stimuli, carry over to the iden-
tification and categorization of complex objects in natural scenes. One challenge
is to translate this analysis of the computational principles underlying object cat-
egorization into a mature understanding of how neurons along the ventral visual
pathway can implement such operations [Sigala and Logothetis, 2002, Op de Beeck
et al., 2001].
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Part II
Attention
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CHAPTER 6
Attention and eye movements
6.1 Introduction
Attention is the ubiquitous mechanism that regulates the bottleneck between the
massively parallel world of sensation and the serial world of cognition [James,
1890]. This is particularly true in the visual system of primates, where 50% of the
primary visual cortex is devoted to processing input from the central 2% (10◦) of
the visual field [Wandell, 1995]. In order to benefit from this non-uniform alloca-
tion of processing resources, the visual system relies on a combination of covert
and overt attention-shifting mechanisms to efficiently bring behaviorally-relevant
stimuli under the lens of central vision [Treue, 2003].
We used eye movements as an overt measure of where observers are directing
their covert attention. This method is based on the pre-motor theory of attention
[Rizzolatti et al., 1987], which suggests eye movements and attention shifts are
driven by the same internal mechanisms. Links between eye movements and at-
tention have been demonstrated by behavioral [Sheliga et al., 1994, 1995, Hoffman
and Subramaniam, 1995, Kowler et al., 1995, Hafed and Clark, 2002] as well as
physiological [Kustov and Robinson, 1996, Moore and Fallah, 2001, Moore et al.,
2003, Moore and Fallah, 2004] and imaging [Nobre et al., 2000, Beauchamp et al.,
2001] studies. A computational model of attention [Itti et al., 1998, Itti and Koch,
2001] has been shown to predict locations likely to be fixated by human observers
with significantly better-than-chance accuracy [Parkhurst et al., 2002]. Despite
these results, covert and overt attentional fixation locations may sometimes be
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distinct [Posner and Cohen, 1984]; nevertheless it is likely that in the absence of
explicit instructions to the contrary, overt and covert shifts of attention are closely
related.
Our basic understanding of visual attention, as in all neuroscience, is primar-
ily informed by direct sources such as measurement of brain activity (single-unit
recording, EEG, MEG, fMRI) and of behavior (psychophysics). In the present study
we used quantitative functional models to test hypotheses regarding the links be-
tween brain and behavior. Specifically, we asked whether, and to what extent,
human fixation behavior is influenced by two putative physiological mechanisms
reflecting the connectivity between neurons in V1. The first, covered in Chap-
ter 7, corresponds to short-range interactions within a hypercolumn between units
tuned having similar spatial receptive fields, but tuned to different orientations or
spatial scales. The second, covered in Chapter 8, corresponds to long-range lateral
connections between units having non-overlapping spatial receptive fields, and
with orientation tunings that relate to the detection of elongated contours.
In both of these cases, we show that the mechanism being modeled has a signif-
icant influence on the locations that observers choose to fixate. More importantly,
we find this effect in tasks involving free viewing of complex naturalistic scenes.
Thus, the success of these models helps to support a quantitative link between
observers’ unconstrained overt behavior and the detailed functional properties of
individual neurons as inferred from single-unit recordings and psychophysics ex-
periments with constrained stimuli and task conditions. This detailed computa-
tional model of bottom-up, salience-based attention is useful for a range of appli-
cations from neuroscience to engineering. Machine vision systems face the same
difficulties as do biological vision systems, and so a quantitative implementation of
attentional selection can lead to similar improvements for machine vision systems.
Indeed, models of bottom-up attention have been shown to improve the perfor-
mance of traditional computer vision object recognition systems, both in training
and in recall [Miau and Itti, 2001, Walther et al., 2002, Rutishauser et al., 2004].
Accurate models of behavior also serve a very practical goal in human-machine
interface. Particularly for visual attention, there are many attention-demanding
situations (e.g., driving, flying) in which even a trained expert could occasionally
benefit from an assistant system that was trained to match the expert’s optimal
behavior. None of this denies the crucial roles of top-down, task-dependent atten-
tion in conscious vision [James, 1890, Koch, 2004], yet in the absence of detailed
quantitative models, we have concentrated here on the contribution of bottom-up,
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salience-driven cues to fixation.
Twelve psychophysics subjects (ages 18–25) from the Caltech community par-
ticipated as paid volunteers in the experiments described below. Informed consent
was obtained from all subjects, and experimental procedures were approved by
the California Institute of Technology’s Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects.
6.2 Stimuli
a b c d
Figure 6.1. Samples from each of the image databases used for psychophysics and
modeling experiments. All of the databases contained only grayscale images, except for
the fractals which contained exclusively color images. Note that for didactic purposes,
these same four exemplar images are used in subsequent figures to illustrate the output of
each model component. (a) Overhead satellite imagery (grayscale; 10 m resolution “digi-
tal orthorectified”; publicly available from NGA). The inset provides a zoomed view of the
boxed region. (b) Outdoor photographs (grayscale; Van Hateren database). (c) Computer-
generated fractals (color; generated with gnofract4d software). (d) Gabor “snakes” and
Gabor arrays — grayscale arrays of randomly spaced and oriented Gabor elements, some
containing “snakes,” or sequences of elements aligned so as to form a strong percept of a
contour. The inset shows the boxed area at higher resolution. Although the “snake” is not
highly visible at the scale shown here, these contours are strongly salient when viewed at
the scale used in our psychophysics experiments.
We used four classes of images (Figure 6.1), ranging in size from 1000× 1000 to
1536× 1024 pixels, for a visual angle subtended of roughly 15.8◦ × 15.8◦ to 16.2◦ ×
25◦. The experiments reported here typically included roughly 100 images from
each image class:
• grayscale overhead satellite imagery, 10-meter resolution “digital orthorecti-
fied” (DOI10m) 1;
• grayscale outdoor photographs2 [van Hateren and van der Schaaf, 1998];
1From the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (http://geoengine.nga.mil/)
2Available from http://hlab.phys.rug.nl/imlib/
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• computer generated color fractals3;
• grayscale Gabor “snakes” and Gabor arrays containing arrays of Gabor ele-
ments with random orientations, phases, and spatial locations, generated
with a previously-described algorithm [Braun, 1999a,b]; some of the arrays
included “snakes,” or sequences of Gabor elements with orientations aligned
so as to induce a strong percept of a contour, even though element spacing
and Gabor phase were otherwise random (see also Figure 8.1 for a more de-
tailed view of these Gabor arrays).
6.3 Free-viewing task
free-viewing task
1000ms fixation 3000ms image 2-AFC: which region
was more interesting?
region 1
region 2
Figure 6.2. Illustration of the free-viewing task that subjects performed while their eye
movements were recorded with an infrared eye tracker operating at 120 Hz. Each trial
began with a fixation cross (1000 ms), followed by a stimulus image (3000 ms) drawn from
one of the image categories shown in Figure 6.1. After the image disappeared, a subjects
were presented with a single line bisecting the screen into two regions, and were asked
to make a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) as to whether they thought “the most
interesting point” in the just-seen image fell in region 1 or region 2. The orientation of
the line varied from trial to trial; since subjects could not predict the orientation, they were
forced to consider the entire stimulus image, without being encouraged to focus on any
particular aspect of the image.
Images were presented to subjects in a free-viewing task (Figure 6.2). Each trial
began with a 1000 ms fixation cross at the center of a blank screen, which subjects
were instructed to fixate. This imposed some consistency on the initial conditions
of the subsequent scanpaths, across different images and observers. Following the
3Some of the fractal images were drawn from the online Spanky Fractal Database
(http://spanky.triumf.ca/) and others were custom-designed with freely-available gnofract4d
software (http://gnofract4d.sourceforge.net/).
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fixation cross, a target image was shown for 3000 ms. Subjects were instructed
to “look around the image” with no restrictions except the knowledge that they
would have to provide a response, as follows. Immediately after the target image
disappeared, a single line was presented at an arbitrary orientation bisecting the
screen into two regions of equal size. The two regions were labeled as “1” and “2,”
and subjects were required to make a button press indicating which region con-
tained the location that they had found “most interesting” in the previous image.
Our motivations for requiring this response were twofold:
• to encourage subjects to be vigilant in their task and engage in active eye
movements (without a minimal task to motivate them, subjects might effi-
ciently choose to make no eye movements at all); and
• to avoid imposing any particular top-down bias on the task (such as would
occur if subjects were asked to search for horizontal lines, or to judge the
brightness of the image, or to name objects in the image), allowing direct
comparisons with a model of bottom-up attention.
Although no time limit was imposed on the responses, subjects were encouraged
prior to the experiment not to dwell on the choice for too long, but rather to make
their best guess if they felt unsure.
6.4 Eye tracking
Subjects were seated 75 cm from a CRT used for stimulus display, which covered
26◦ × 19◦ of visual angle, and were asked to use a chinrest in order to minimize
eye-tracking errors due to head movements. We used an infrared (IR) eye-tracking
system (ISCAN, Inc.) to sample and record subjects’ eye position at 120 Hz (see
Figure 6.3). An illuminator and camera were placed ∼65 cm from the subject, and
his or her right eye was illuminated with a beam of low-intensity (∼1 mW/cm2)
invisible IR light (∼850 nm). The camera recorded a closeup image of the eye,
which was processed in real time to extract the positions of two features: (1) p, the
IR-dark spot at the center of the pupil, and (2) c, the IR-bright spot where the IR
beam produces a specularity on the cornea. The vector difference v′ = p − c of
these two positions gives a measure of eye position that is independent of head
position. An empirical correspondence between v′ (in camera coordinates) and
the subject’s real-world point-of-regard v (in stimulus display coordinates) was
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stimulus display
(35x25 cm)
75 cm
observer
illuminator
camera
corneal
reflection
(b)(a)
Figure 6.3. (a) Shown here is a diagram of the setup used in eye-tracking experiments.
Each subject was seated with his or her chin in a chinrest, 75cm from a computer monitor
on which stimulus images were displayed. The right eye was illuminated with invisible
infrared light, and was recorded with an infrared camera. The camera image was similar
to that shown in (b); the features of interest for inferring subjects’ eye position were the
center of the pupil and the center of the corneal reflection generated by the infrared light
beam. Under the assumption that the eye is roughly spherical, the corneal reflection does
not move during a pure eye movement (the eye rotates within the socket), and during a
translational head movement the pupil does not move relative to the corneal reflection.
established by a set of calibration trials in which the subject fixated a series of
crosses shown at 25 different locations on an invisible 5 × 5 grid in the stimulus
display (see Figure 6.4 for an illustration of this process). These v-v′ pairings could
then be used to interpolate the subject’s point-of-regard throughout the remainder
of the session. Following every session, each lasting about 12 minutes, we re-
recorded subjects’ eye positions at the 25 calibration locations in order to assess
how much drift had occurred during the recording session. Across 300 calibration
points (4 subjects, 3 sessions per subject, 25 points per session), the mean error was
0.37◦ degrees of visual angle.
For subsequent comparison with salience models, we used the human eye-
tracking data both in its raw form (a 120 Hz time-series of spatial locations) as well
as in a processed form in which we parsed each scanpath into a series of fixation
intervals. This process is illustrated and described in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.4. These plots illustrate the calibration process for two example subjects (row 1
and row 2). Subjects initially fixate 25 points on a 5 × 5 grid (clusters in left column), and
the position of the pupil center relative to the corneal reflection is recorded. Since the cor-
responding screen coordinates of these points are known, an empirical mapping relation
can be established between eye position in camera coordinates, and calibrated point-of-
regard in screen coordinates. The center column shows the same fixation sequence at
left, but transformed into screen coordinates. Finally, subjects were tested on the same
25-point fixation grid following each experiment, and these data were mapped into screen
coordinates using the mapping defined by the pre-experiment fixation sequence. The right
column shows the calibrated screen coordinates from the pre-experiment (green central
circles) and post-experiment (red circles offset from grid); any differences reflect calibra-
tion errors likely due to rotational head movements by the subject or to changes in the
wetness (and hence the reflectivity) of the retina over the course of the experiment,
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Figure 6.5. Shown here is an illustration of the method used to parse a scanpath into a
sequence of fixation intervals. The raw data were 120 Hz sequences of x and y position
in screen coordinates, following the calibration method outlined in Figure 6.4. These were
first smoothed slightly with a 5-point median filter; sample results are shown in the first (x)
and third (y) traces from the top at left. Second, the x and y velocity components were es-
timated by convolving the smoothed position traces with a [−1 0 1] filter; results are shown
in the second and fourth traces. Finally these were used to compute the magnitude of the
velocity (bottom trace), and an adaptive cutoff value was chosen (dashed line) to differ-
entiate between steady fixation intervals and saccade or eyeblink intervals. The intervals
identified as fixations are indicated by the gray boxes beneath each of the traces at left and
by the solid lines within the position traces. At right, the original scanpath is shown over-
laid on the stimulus image, and the fixation intervals are marked by boxes whose numbers
indicate the temporal order.
6.5 Salience model
All of the models described here4 are based on the computational architecture of a
salience model of bottom-up visual attention first proposed by Koch and Ullman
[1985] and developed in detail by Itti et al. [1998] (see Figure 6.6). Each input
image is processed in parallel through a number of feature channels (e.g., one each
for color, luminance, orientation), and the outputs of these channels are ultimately
combined to form a single salience map. This map ascribes a scalar value to each
4Source code for the iLab Neuromorphic Vision Toolkit (iNVT), including the salience model
and each of the extensions described below, is freely available under the GNU General Public Li-
cense (GPL) at http://ilab.usc.edu/toolkit/.
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Figure 6.6. Schematic diagram of the salience model (top) and salience maps corre-
sponding to the four exemplar images from Figure 6.1 (bottom row). In the salience model,
an input image is processed in parallel through multiple channels. In each channel (here
for luminance, orientation, or color), the image is filtered at nine spatial scales, and the
resulting feature maps pass through a center-surround operation to accentuate contrast.
The center-surround maps are combined across spatial scales leading to one conspicu-
ity map per channel, and finally these conspicuity maps are combined across features to
produce a single feature-independent salience map. Additional channels may be included
in parallel to the three channels shown here; in our experiments, we tested a modified
orientation channel that included short-range orientation interactions (Figure 7.1) and a
contour-integration channel based on long-range orientation interactions (Figure 8.2).
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point in the input image, indicating how salient or “interesting” that location is,
regardless of which features contributed to the salience.
The individual channels share a common architecture as well. In general, the
input image is first passed through a series of linear filters at nine spatial scales
to form a dyadic pyramid. These filter outputs are then subject to spatial compe-
tition via a center-surround operation, implemented as a difference between fine
and coarse scales in the pyramid. Typically there are six feature maps generated
by this center-surround operation, using center scales c ∈ {2, 3, 4} and surround
scales at s = c + δ, with δ ∈ {3, 4}. The feature maps are summed across scales
and passed through a nonlinear normalization operation designed to reduce or
eliminate numerous weak local maxima in favor of a small number of stronger
near-global maxima. This produces a single conspicuity map representing the out-
put of the channel; these conspicuity maps are eventually summed across channels
and renormalized to produce the final salience map.
The standard channels for static images include an luminance channel that re-
sponds to luminance contrast, an orientation channel (including filter outputs from
multiple scales and orientations) that responds to orientation contrast, and a color
channel that responds to opponent-color contrast. These reflect many of the fun-
damental computational operations thought to be performed in the early stages of
the visual system [Marr, 1982, Wandell, 1995]. Nevertheless, the modular architec-
ture of the salience model allows other new channels to be included in parallel to
the standard channels, or even to replace one or more of them. This is the approach
we used in testing more detailed models of interactions among orientation-tuned
units, as described next.
6.6 Comparing model and eye-tracking data
Our analyses rested on the degree of correspondence between human fixation lo-
cations and model salience maps. The most straightforward approach was as fol-
lows (Figure 6.7). Each salience map was linearly normalized to have zero mean
and unit standard deviation. Next, the normalized salience values were extracted
from each point corresponding to the fixation locations along a subject’s scanpath,
and the mean of these values, or normalized scanpath salience (NSS), was taken as
a measure of the correspondence between the salience map and scanpath. Due
to the pre-normalization of the salience map, normalized scanpath salience val-
ues greater than zero suggest a greater correspondence than would be expected by
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Figure 6.7. Illustration of the method used to compare fixation locations obtained from eye
tracking with salience maps obtained from various computational models. (a) A sample
image is shown to both the human observer and the model. (b) The model generates a
salience map (grayscale image), which is normalized to have zero-mean and unit stan-
dard deviation (see scalebar). A series of fixation locations is generated by the observer
(connected dots), and the normalized salience value is extracted for each location (values
are shown here next to the corresponding fixation locations). (c) The average normalized
salience value across all fixation locations is taken as the normalized scanpath salience
(NSS), and compared against the distribution of salience values across the entire salience
map (gray histogram). For the scanpath shown here, the normalized scanpath salience
indicates that, on average, the model-predicted salience at fixated locations was 1.304
standard deviations above chance level. Since the NSS is scale-free, it can be used to
compare the degree of correspondence between observed and predicted behavior for dif-
ferent observers and images.
chance between fixation locations and the salient points predicted by the model;
a value of zero indicates no such correspondence, while values less than zero
indicate an anti-correspondence between fixation locations and model-predicted
salient points. Also because of the pre-normalization, these measures could be
compared across different subjects, image classes, and model variants; with such
a data pool, statistical tests indicated whether the distribution of NSS values was
different from the zero-mean distribution that would be expected by chance.
Our approach is similar to that taken by Parkhurst et al. [2002] in that both
rely on a linear transformation of salience values; however, our approach uses a
variable dynamic range based on the variance of the salience values, while the al-
ternate approach uses a fixed dynamic range based on the difference between the
minimum and maximum values (which were rescaled to 0 and 100, respectively, in
Parkhurst et al., 2002). In addition, our approach compares salience values at fix-
ated locations to chance distributions unique to each image; the alternate approach
compares salience values to a single chance distribution based on all images in a
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Table 6.1. Shown here is a summary of the fits between each model and the scanpaths
recorded during the free-viewing task (Figure 6.2). Each number represents the average
normalized scanpath salience (NSS) value, for a given model, across all of the fixation
locations recorded while observers freely viewed images for 3000 ms each. The NSS val-
ues were obtained by the method illustrated in Figure 6.7, in which salience maps were
first normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation, and then for each scan-
path the average normalized salience was computed for the fixation locations along the
scanpath. Thus for the data shown here, a value of zero would indicate the absence of a
correspondence between model predictions and observed fixation locations; a value of one
would indicate that, on average, the model-predicted salience was one standard deviation
above chance at each fixation location for all observers and all images in the given image
category. The first three rows show these correspondences for salience maps predicted
by a random model, the baseline salience model (Figure 6.6), and the control condition
in which the “salience map” is derived from all observers’ scanpaths. This last condition
quantifies how well the pooled fixation locations from all observers predict the specific fix-
ation locations of individual observers; as such, it provides a theoretical upper limit for
the performance of the models, since the models are not designed to account for inter-
observer variability. Thus, the next three rows express the performance of each model as
a percentage of the corresponding upper limit.
Outdoor Fractal Satellite Gabor snake Gabor array
NSS
Random model -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Baseline salience model 0.69 0.44 0.62 0.10 0.14
Inter-observer 1.30 1.13 1.10 1.15 0.91
given image category. Our method was intended to accommodate the wide va-
riety of salience distributions observed for different input images (for example,
consider how a salience map with 100 points, 90 with value 1.0 and 10 with value
0.0, would be handled relative to a second salience map with 100 values spaced
evenly between 0.0 and 1.0).
A summary of all of the fits between models and human behavior in the free-
viewing task is given in Table 6.1. Each number gives the average NSS across all
observers and images in that image class. In general, our data agree with previous
results [Parkhurst et al., 2002] showing that the baseline salience model was sig-
nificantly above chance (p < 10−23) at predicting locations likely to be fixated by
observers in a free-viewing task. As expected, this result was largely independent
of image category for naturalistic images such as the overhead imagery, outdoor
photos, and fractals, but did not hold for more artificial images such as the Gabor
arrays, for which the baseline salience model was virtually at chance in predicting
fixation locations. Indeed, we chose to use the Gabor arrays for exactly this reason:
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Table 6.2. Shown here is the performance of each model (average normalized scanpath
salience, NSS) as a percentage of the corresponding upper limit given by the NSS of the
inter-observer model. The arrangement of the table is the same as in Table 6.1.
Outdoor Fractal Satellite Gabor snake Gabor array
NSS % of Inter-observer NSS
Random model 0% -2% 2% -1% 2%
Baseline salience model 53% 39% 57% 9% 15%
Inter-observer 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
nothing in the baseline model can “see” the contours, yet they are perceptually
salient to observers.
The theoretical range of NSS values is bounded from below by the behavior
of a random “model,” in which the salience maps simply contain noise drawn
from a normal distribution, and bounded from above by the behavior of an inter-
observer “model” in which the salience maps are generated by the pooled fixation
locations from all observers. The very nature of our analysis method requires that
the random model should produce NSS values of 0, and indeed we find values
that are nearly 0 (slight differences from 0 are due to the finite size of our data set).
On the other end, we find that the inter-observer yields NSS values between 0.9
and 1.3, depending on the image type. So one way to intuitively understand the
performance of the salience model is to consider its performance as a percentage of
the difference between the fit of the random and inter-observer “models.” These
values are shown in Table 6.2 and range from 39% to 57% for the natural image
classes and from 9% to 15% for the Gabor arrays.
6.7 Discussion
Our experiments were based on a simple attempt to explain human behavior in
an image-viewing task with purely bottom-up models of attention; we have disre-
garded important top-down contributions from attentional state, past experience,
and inter-observer differences, in order to assess how much can be predicted from
bottom-up influences alone. In this respect our method follows that of Parkhurst
et al. [2002], and our results with the baseline model are in agreement as well: we
found highly significant correspondences between model predictions and human
fixation locations. However, the main focus of the present study was to extend this
method to test, via more specific models, whether certain early vision mechanisms
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play a significant role in determining subjects’ fixation locations, a task that we
will undertake in Chapters 7 and 8.
We have relied on an assumption of a substantial overlap between the biolog-
ical mechanisms responsible for covert attention shifts and overt eye movements;
on this “pre-motor theory of attention” [Rizzolatti et al., 1987], attention shifts are
essentially planned saccades whose motor execution is inhibited. This is supported
by behavioral evidence showing that, despite motor inhibition, the spatial locus
of attention exerts a small but detectable influence on the trajectories of subse-
quent saccades [Sheliga et al., 1994, 1995, Kustov and Robinson, 1996] or on the
distribution of microsaccades during fixation [Hafed and Clark, 2002]. These re-
sults suggest that computational models of attention and saccadic eye movements
would be nearly identical up until the execution stage, where the dynamics would
be expected to change due to the motor inertia of eye movements or the differing
strengths of inhibition-of-return. Indeed, it is plausible that other modes of behav-
ioral output, such as verbal report or finger-pointing, could be driven by the same
core mechanisms. Chapter 9 will describe ongoing work using such approaches
to further explore which computational elements are intrinsic to spatial attention,
and which are specific to particular output modalities [Briand et al., 2000, Astafiev
et al., 2003].
In working with the salience model, we found that not only was there a strong
correspondence between model and fixation locations, but that in addition the
model accounted for a large overall fraction of the observed behavior. Allowing
that this general model of vision is not intended to account for inter-observer dif-
ferences, an absolute upper limit on the performance of such models is given by
the ability to predict one subjects’ behavior from the average behavior of the re-
maining subjects. As shown in Table 6.2, the performance of the models we tested
was around 50% of this theoretical limit; as a crude measure, this suggests that the
models accounted for roughly half of the variance in spatial positions of fixated
locations, outside of inter-observer differences. In the next chapters, we will exam-
ine whether more detailed models of specific visual processing mechanisms can
bring us closer to this theoretical inter-observer upper limit.
CHAPTER 7
Short-range orientation interactions
7.1 Introduction
Short-range interactions among orientation-tuned units in V1 with retinotopically
overlapping receptive fields have been shown to play an important role in de-
tection and discrimination thresholds in a range of psychophysical tasks involv-
ing Gabor-like grating stimuli [Lee et al., 1999]. Such interactions can be imple-
mented as a form of divisive inhibition leading to contrast-enhancement—similar
to a center-surround operation, but operating in the orientation and frequency do-
main rather than in the spatial domain. Furthermore, divisive inhibition provides
the gain control needed to work within the limited dynamic range of neurons
[Heeger, 1992]. In this chapter, we ask whether a salience model that includes
short-range orientation interactions could account for behavior in a naturalistic
free-viewing task that would not have been explained by the baseline salience
model.
7.2 A model of short-range orientation interactions
We adapted a model of interactions among overlapping orientation-tuned units
[Lee et al., 1999, Itti et al., 2000] (see Figure 7.1) that could be substituted for the
standard orientation channel in the salience model. In this enhanced orientation
channel, orientation-sensitive units tuned to overlapping spatial locations, but to
different orientations θ and spatial frequencies ω, form an inhibitory pool. In
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the two-stage model, the feed-forward first-stage response Eθ,ω is subject to self-
excitation and suppression from the inhibitory pool. The result of these interac-
tions is the non-linear second-stage response Rθ,ω, given by
Rθ,ω =
(Eθ,ω)γ
Sδ + ∑θ′,ω′ Wθθ′ ,ωω′(Eθ′ ,ω′)δ
δ, γ : power-law exponents
S : semi-saturation constant
Wθθ′,ωω′ = e
− (θ−θ
′)2
2Σ2
θ e
−
(ω−ω′)2
2Σ2ω
Σθ , Σω : widths of inhibitory pool
It should be noted that in the original model, the feed-forward responses Eθ,ω were
calculated using ideal filters tuned for a given θ and ω:
Eθ,ω = Acse
− (θs−θ)
2
2σ2
θ e
−
(ωs−ω)2
2σ2ω + B
cs : stimulus contrast
θs : stimulus orientation
ωs : stimulus spatial frequency
σθ : sharpness of orientation tuning
σω : sharpness of spatial frequency tuning
A : contrast gain
B : background activity level
In contrast, for the modified version that was incorporated into the salience model,
we simply used the values already computed in the dyadic orientation-tuned pyra-
mids. Lee et al. [1999] used an extensive series of psychophysics experiments to
calibrate the interactions in this model, and we used the same calibrated values in
the version of that was included into the salience model.
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Figure 7.1. At top is a schematic diagram of the short-range orientation interactions model.
In this model, an input image is passed through a set of linear filters tuned to different ori-
entations and spatial frequencies. The linear outputs feed forward into a second stage, in
which the set of filter outputs corresponding to a given spatial location form a pool that divi-
sively inhibits each unit’s response at that location. As a result of this recurrent processing,
the second stage output exhibits gain control and contrast enhancement relative to the first
stage. The bottom row of images shows the salience map produced by a modified model
including short-range orientation interactions, for each of the four exemplar images from
Figure 6.1. Figure adapted from Lee et al. [1999].
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Figure 7.2. Depicted here is the effect of including short-range orientation interactions
in the orientation channel of the salience model. The same input image (a) was given
to the baseline salience model and the modified model including short-range orientation
interactions, and the resulting salience maps from the two models are shown in (b) and (c),
respectively. At right (d-e) are shown the internal workings of the short-range orientation
interactions for one of the nine spatial scales involved in the model. Each row represents
one of eight filter orientations. In (d) is the raw linear response of the oriented filters—these
responses are used directly in the baseline model. However, the modified model uses the
results shown in the next column (e), which include the effects of cross-scale and cross-
orientation inhibition (even though only one scale is shown here, the results still reflect the
effects of cross-scale inhibition from other scales that are not shown here).
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7.3 Model fits
Table 7.1. Shown here is a comparison of the baseline salience model and the modified
model including short-range orientation interactions. The models are judged by comparing
their predictions with the scanpaths recorded during the free-viewing task (Figure 6.2), us-
ing the normalized scanpath salience (NSS) as described in the previous chapter. The first
four rows are arranged identically to Table 6.1, except that a new has been added for the
modified model introduced in this chapter. The bottom four rows express the performance
of each model as a percentage of the NSS attained by the inter-observer model, as in
Table 6.2.
Outdoor Fractal Satellite Gabor snake Gabor array
NSS
Random model -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Baseline salience model 0.69 0.44 0.62 0.10 0.14
Short-range interactions 0.75∗ 0.56∗ 0.71∗ 0.11 0.14
Inter-observer 1.30∗ 1.13∗ 1.10∗ 1.15∗ 0.91∗
NSS % of Inter-observer NSS
Random model 0% -2% 2% -1% 2%
Baseline salience model 53% 39% 57% 9% 15%
Short-range interactions 57% 50% 65% 10% 15%
Inter-observer 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
∗, models whose fit was significantly better than the corresponding baseline salience model, p <
0.05
When the model of short-range orientation interactions was substituted for the
standard orientation channel in the salience model, we observed a statistically sig-
nificant 10–20% improvement in the model fits across all of the image classes, ex-
cept for the Gabor snake and Gabor array images in which there was no effect of
the short-range orientation interactions (Table 7.1). Average NSS values ranged
from 0.56 to 0.75 for the natural image classes, and from 0.11 to 0.14 for the Gabor
arrays.
The interactions in the modified model were based on the lateral inhibition
that takes place within a V1 hypercolumn, which in turn is an abstraction of the
concept that for a given receptive field visual space, there is a confined popula-
tion of cells in primary visual cortex that are tuned to all possible spatial scales
and orientations. Lateral inhibition is a ubiquitous element in sensory processing
along spatial, temporal, and higher-order feature dimensions, as it decorrelates the
input, emphasizing regions with high contrast and deemphasizing relatively ho-
mogeneous regions. Ultimately this allows behaviorally relevant input to be repre-
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sented in a more explicit and compact manner. Lee et al. [1999] used psychophysics
experiments to validate a V1 hypercolumn model, showing that changes in at-
tentional state could be explained by changing the relative contributions of feed-
forward excitatory and feed-back inhibitory connections. These connections deter-
mine, among other things, how easily an observer is able to identify a low-contrast
grating in the presence of an overlapping grating of a different orientation. When
we included these connections in our salience model, we found that the model’s
salience maps predicted observers’ fixation locations significantly better. Thus,
these connections, previously modeled with well-controlled minimalistic stimuli,
also appear behaviorally relevant under less restrictive task conditions involving
free-viewing natural scenes.
CHAPTER 8
Long-range orientation interactions
8.1 Introduction
The visual system is exquisitely sensitive to contours, even when they are de-
fined by scant evidence, as in the Gabor arrays shown in Figure 8.1. The abil-
ity to detect such contours is thought to rely on long-range interactions among
V1 orientation-tuned units with non-overlapping receptive fields. The presence
of these interactions has been inferred from neuroanatomy and electrophysiology
[Blasdel, 1992, Pettet and Gilbert, 1992, Das and Gilbert, 1999, Stettler et al., 2002]
and from psychophysical studies demonstrating increased or decreased contrast
detection thresholds at a central location depending on the presence and orien-
tation of surround elements [Polat and Sagi, 1993, 1994a, Zenger and Sagi, 1996,
Zenger et al., 2000]. An appropriate arrangement of connection strengths [Polat
and Sagi, 1994b, Li, 1998, Braun, 1999a, Li and Gilbert, 2002], involving facilita-
tion between nearly collinear edge segments and inhibition between non-collinear
parallel and orthogonal segments, has the effect of enhancing the activity of units
that respond to the segments comprising an elongated contour. We adapted one
model of such interactions [Mundhenk and Itti, 2002] to test whether such contour-
facilitation plays a role in directing eye movements, and furthermore how that role
depends on the relevance of contours to the behavioral task.
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(a) Gabor array
(b) Gabor array with embedded implicit contour ("snake")
Figure 8.1. These are examples of the Gabor array images that were used in psy-
chophysics experiments and in testing of the contour-integration model. The two arrays
shown here are identical except for the orientation of certain elements in (b) giving rise to
an implicit contour, or “snake.” In each array, the spatial positions of the Gabor elements
are assigned randomly subject to certain minimum and maximum inter-element distance
constraints. The phases of the gratings are assigned randomly for all elements. The orien-
tations are also assigned randomly except for the snake elements. In fact, the only feature
that distinguishes a snake from its background is the orientation of its member elements;
phase and inter-element spacing are identical for snake and background elements.
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8.2 Contour-integration model
We adapted a model of long-range orientation interactions [Mundhenk and Itti,
2002] (Figure 8.2) that was included as a new channel in the salience model1. In
essence, this model relies on a set of weight matrices that determine how one
orientation-tuned unit is influenced by other such units at different distances and
orientations (Figure 8.3), in a manner reflecting the long-range connections thought
to be present in primary visual cortex [Blasdel, 1992]. These matrices are some-
times described by their shape which resembles a “butterfly” or “bow-tie,” with
wedges of excitatory connections leading from the central unit to other units that
are similarly tuned and nearly collinear. Outside these wedge-shaped regions,
there are inhibitory connections from the central unit leading to other similarly
tuned units that are nearly parallel but not collinear. Our model did not include
interactions among orthogonal or nearly orthogonal units.
Qualitatively, this model of contour integration was found to yield very satis-
factory results when applied either to naturalistic images or to the Gabor arrays.
Figure 8.4 shows the output from the contour model for two of the overhead satel-
lite photos; the model highlights the contours that might be intuitively expected to
be salient contours in such images, including roads, coastlines, and rivers. We
also made a rough comparison between this contour model and two standard
edge-detection algorithms from computer vision, the Canny and Sobel algorithms.
These results are shown in Figure 8.5; it appears that the contour model is more
able to highlight the “main contour” as our visual system perceives it, without al-
lowing large amounts of background noise to seep through into the output. This is
an admittedly weak test of the Canny and Sobel algorithms, since we used the im-
plementations straight “out-of-the-box” from MATLAB; nevertheless it suggests
that the contour model is perhaps qualitatively different from such algorithms.
1Special thanks to Nathan Mundhenk for sharing a reference implementation of the contour-
integration model.
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Figure 8.2. At top is a schematic diagram of the long-range orientation interactions
(contour-integration) model. In this model, an input image is passed through a series
of filters tuned to 12 orientations (only 4 are depicted in the figure), all tuned to the same
spatial scale. The first stage filter outputs feed forward into second stage activation maps
via a set of kernels that specify connection strengths as a function of relative spatial posi-
tion and relative orientation tuning (see Figure 8.3). These connections are arranged so
as to selectively enhance locations that form part of an elongated contour. The activation
maps are summed across orientations and passed through a sigmoid non-linearity to yield
the final output map. The model output evolves iteratively (three iterations were used in
the present study); the second stage maps recurrently excite their first stage counterparts,
and the output map recurrently dynamically modulates the strength of inhibition within the
connection kernels in order to limit the dynamic range of the output. In practice, the model
was instantiated for three spatial scales, but there were no interactions between scales at
the intermediate stages; the outputs from each of the spatial scales were summed at the
final stage to produce an overall output. The bottom row of images shows the salience
maps produced by a modified salience model including a contour-integration channel, for
the four exemplar images shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 8.3. Illustration of the weight matrices that connect neighboring units at different
orientations in the contour model of Figure 8.2. (a) Each grid entry is a spatial array
depicting the connection strengths between a central unit (unit 1) tuned to the orientation
given by the column label, and a neighboring unit (unit 2) tuned to the orientation given
by the row label. Within each grid entry, the spatial separation between unit 1 and unit
2 is represented by the x- and y-axes indicate, and connection strength is represented
by gray level: lighter pixels reflect regions of excitation, darker pixels reflect regions of
inhibition, and gray pixels reflect the absence of any connection. The “butterfly” shape of
the kernels indicates that there are symmetric cones of excitation connecting a central unit
with neighbors whose position and orientation is such that the two units are either collinear
or fall on a contour of low curvature, as well as symmetric flanks of inhibition between
units that represent contour elements that are nearly parallel and non-collinear. (b) An
enlargement of the 90◦/90◦ kernel. Here, connection strength is represented by z-axis
height as well as gray level, with values above and below 0.0 representing excitation and
inhibition, respectively.
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(a)
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(d)
78.6250ºW-78.5000ºW
36.6250ºN-35.7188ºN
43.8750ºE-44.0000ºE
33.2187ºN-33.3125ºN
Figure 8.4. Shown here are two images (a,c) from the overhead imagery database, and
the corresponding outputs from the contour-integration model (b,d).
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(a) input (b) contour-integration
(c) sobel (d) sobel after blur
(e) canny (f) canny after blur
(g) input (h) contour-integration
(i) sobel (j) sobel after blur
(k) canny (l) canny after blur
Figure 8.5. Shown here are two image fragments from the overhead imagery database,
along with the results of processing those images with either the contour-integration model
or standard edge-detection algorithms in the MATLAB image-processing toolbox (canny
and sobel). (a) Input image. (b) Result of contour-integration model. (c) Result of Sobel
edge-detection algorithm; (d) Sobel algorithm after first blurring the input image. (e) Result
of Canny edge-detection algorithm; (f) Canny algorithm after first blurring the input image.
(g-l) Same operations for a different input image.
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8.3 Contour-detection task
(a) free-viewing task
(b) contour-detection task
1000ms fixation 3000ms image 2-AFC: which region
was more interesting?
1000ms fixation 2500ms image 500ms mask 2-AFC: was this
contour present?
region 1
region 2
Figure 8.6. Illustration of the new contour-detection task (b), in comparison with the orig-
inal free-viewing task (a) (duplicated from Figure 6.2). In the contour-detection task (b),
each trial began with a fixation cross followed by a stimulus image as in the free-viewing
task. However, when the image disappeared it was replaced by a full-screen uniform white
mask. This was followed by a new response screen containing a single schematic contour,
and subjects made a 2-AFC as to whether there had been a matching contour at the same
location in the just-seen image (in the example shown here, the contour does match the
image). On 50% of trials there was such a match, and on the other 50% of trials a non-
matching contour was selected from among the contours that matched other images in the
same category.
We used a second task to investigate the influence of contours on fixation loca-
tions (Figure 8.6b). The overall format was similar to the free-viewing task, except
(1) the image presentation time was shortened from 3000 ms to 2500 ms, (2) a full-
screen uniform white mask was presented for 500 ms immediately after each image
to prevent subjects from relying on retinal afterimages to perform the task, and (3)
a different response was required, as explained next. After the image and the mask,
subjects were presented with a schematic line-drawn contour, and were asked to
respond with a key press to indicate whether that contour matched a contour that
was present at the same location in the image they had just seen. On half of the tri-
als, the contour was in fact a match to the preceding image, and on the other half,
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the contour was a non-match (selected from a pool of contours that matched other
images in the experiment). The schematic contours were Bezier curves that closely
approximated the shapes of hand-picked salient contours in the target images.
In order to make within-subject comparisons between fixation locations for the
same image but in different tasks (free-viewing or contour-detection), we used the
following experimental design. Images were split into two batches, A and B. Sub-
jects were split into two groups. Subjects in group one performed four blocks: free-
viewing (A images), contour-detection (B images), contour-detection (A images),
free-viewing (B images). Thus, these subjects were naive to the contour-detection
task when performing the free-viewing on batch A, but not when performing
the free-viewing on batch B. The primary comparison of interest is between the
data collected in blocks 1 and 3 — that is, free-viewing versus contour-detection
for the same subjects and the same images, with subjects’ free-viewing behavior
not tainted by knowledge of the contour task. A secondary comparison between
blocks 4 and 2 allows us to address the effect of exposure to the contour task on
subjects’ behavior in the free-viewing task. Subjects in group two performed the
tasks in the same order, but were shown image batch A in place of B and vice versa.
8.4 Model results
We added to the salience model a new channel for contour integration via long-
range orientation interactions2. This led to improved model fits over the baseline
salience model by 19–36% for the image classes, and by ≈ 300% for the Gabor ar-
rays (see Table 8.1). Notably, only with long-range orientation interactions did the
model’s performance rise above chance levels for the Gabor arrays. In addition,
for all image classes except the outdoor photos, contour integration led to a signif-
icant improvement in the fits beyond those attained by including the short-range
orientation interactions. Turning again the theoretical upper limit on model per-
formance attained by the NSS attained by the inter-observer model (defined in Sec-
tion 6.6), we find that the modified salience model including a contour-integration
channel reaches 36% to 74% of this maximum across the different image classes.
Further investigation revealed a large variability in the optimal strength of the
2The new channel was added in parallel to the existing luminance, orientation, and color chan-
nels. Another possibility we considered was using the contour channel as a multiplicative gate on
the standard orientation channel, or even on the entire output of the salience model. In practice,
we found that this arrangement offered no better fit with human fixation locations than did the
standard arrangement of placing the contour channel in parallel next to the other channels
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Table 8.1. This table extends the results shown previously in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 7.1, now
including the normalized scanpath salience (NSS) values resulting from the comparison of
eye-tracking scanpaths with the modified model including a contour-integration channel.
Outdoor Fractal Satellite Gabor snake Gabor array
NSS
Random model -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Baseline salience model 0.69 0.44 0.62 0.10 0.14
Short-range interactions 0.75∗ 0.56∗ 0.71∗ 0.11 0.14
Contour-facilitation 0.72 0.60∗ 0.81∗ 0.41∗ 0.52∗
Inter-observer 1.30∗ 1.13∗ 1.10∗ 1.15∗ 0.91∗
NSS % of Inter-observer NSS
Random model 0% -2% 2% -1% 2%
Baseline salience model 53% 39% 57% 9% 15%
Short-range interactions 57% 50% 65% 10% 15%
Contour-facilitation 55% 53% 74% 36% 58%
Inter-observer 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
∗, models whose fit was significantly better than the corresponding baseline salience model, p <
0.05
contour channel relative to the other channels, depending on the image class. The
outdoor images were fit best with a relatively weak contour channel, the fractal
images with an intermediate strength, and the satellite imagery with a relatively
strong contour channel.
We used a second task to specifically address the role of elongated contours in
selecting fixation locations, by asking subjects to view the same images under two
different task conditions: first, the standard free-viewing task, and subsequently,
a contour-detection task. Table 8.2 shows the results of comparing models with
behavior in these two tasks. Overall, model performance was worse in predict-
ing fixation locations in the contour-detection task than in the free-viewing task;
this is likely because performing the contour-detection task involves a greater top-
down component, whereas the model mimics only bottom-up components. Nev-
ertheless, there was an interaction between task and model: the relative improve-
ment due to the contour-integration model over the baseline model was greater
for the contour-detection task than for the free-viewing task. That is, the contour-
integration model was better suited to the contour-detection task.
8.5. DISCUSSION 97
Table 8.2. Shown here is a summary of the fits between each model and the eye-tracking
data from the free-viewing and contour-detection tasks (Figure 8.6), using the normal-
ized scanpath salience metric described in Figure 6.7 and Table 6.1. In the free-viewing
task, subjects passively observed images, while in the contour-detection task, subjects
were presented with a schematic contour following each image and were required to indi-
cate whether that contour matched one that was present in the just-seen image. These
data illustrate that, relative to the baseline model, the modified model including contour-
integration was more predictive of fixations in the contour-detection task (row 6 versus
row 2) than of fixations in the free-viewing task (row 5 versus row 1).
Model Task Gabor Gabor Outdoor Satellite
array snake
Baseline salience model free-viewing 0.136 0.145 0.450 0.398
contour-detection 0.117 0.126 0.505 0.216
Short-range interactions free-viewing 0.122 0.152 0.538 0.559
contour-detection 0.135 0.131 0.585 0.364
Contour-integration free-viewing 0.565 0.521 0.512 0.713
contour-detection 0.619 0.540 0.588 0.481
8.5 Discussion
We have described in this chapter a model a second type of connection in primary
visual cortex, that of orientation-dependent long-range connections between dif-
ferent hypercolumns. Such connections or their computational equivalent have
been introduced to explain the subjective salience of implicit contours like Gabor
“snakes” that would otherwise be invisible to purely local processing. Indeed,
without long-range connections, the salience model performed very poorly in pre-
dicting observers’ fixation locations in the Gabor arrays, since each individual Ga-
bor element appears equally salient to a purely local mechanism. As we expected,
the model performance increased dramatically (more than threefold) when the
long-range connections were included. However, somewhat unexpected was the
fact that these connections lead to more modest improvements in predicting fixa-
tion locations in the natural image categories. This could be explained in one of
two ways: either the model was not accurately identifying what observers’ con-
sidered to be “contours,” or the observers were giving relatively little weight to
the contours that were present. To distinguish between these possibilities, we per-
formed a second psychophysics experiment in which observers viewed images
under two different task conditions, one requiring them to specifically attend to
contours, and one requiring only free viewing. If our model of contour integra-
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tion based on long-range connections was simply inaccurate, then it should not
have shown any additional benefit in predicting observers’ contour-detection be-
havior over their free-viewing behavior. Instead, we found that the improvement
in model fit due to contour-integration was greater when subjects performed the
contour-detection task than when they performed the free-viewing task. This im-
plies that, although our contour-integration model was accurately highlighting
what would qualitatively be identified as “contours,” observers’ fixation locations
were only weakly influenced by the presence of elongated contours, at least in
natural images where other salient image features were present.
CHAPTER 9
Mouse-clicking
9.1 Introduction
The well-established link between overt eye movements and covert attentional
shifts makes eye tracking an appropriate tool for investigating visual attention; yet,
the logistical requirements of eye tracking—requiring subjects to participate in a
particular physical location, with an experimenter present at all times—place prac-
tical limits the amount of data that can be acquired. With alternative approaches,
we can make a different trade-off, gaining access to a much larger subject pool and
data source, in return for allowing for somewhat less well-controlled experimental
conditions and a less direct connection between the behavioral modality and the
underlying visual attention mechanisms. In concrete terms, our free-viewing eye
movement task could be replaced with a task in which subjects indicate “which
locations are interesting” by, for example, pointing a finger or making a verbal
report [Astafiev et al., 2003]. To validate this type of method, we used one such ap-
proach involving “mouse-clicking.” 1 Our results indicate clear similarities as well
as intriguing differences in the pattern of locations resulting from mouse-clicking
and eye-tracking sessions. Following the success of this pilot study, a wide variety
of full-fledged experiments are now possible that would be far more difficult in a
conventional eye-tracking setting.
1The work described here was performed in collaboration with Dr. Chris Scheier of MediaAn-
alyzer, Inc. (http://www.mediaanalyzer.com), where the internet application was developed and
where the data-tracking database was hosted
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9.2 Mouse-clicking: an alternative to eye tracking
Subjects viewed images on a computer screen in the same task setup as in the eye-
tracking experiments. Instead of having their eye movements recorded, subjects
used a standard computer mouse to click on points in the image that seemed to
attract their attention. To further capitalize on potential data sources, this task was
implemented as an application that could be run on a internet web browser, so that
subjects could perform the task at a time and place of their own choosing. Once
subjects completed the task, their results were sent returned over the network to a
central database server for storage and later analysis.
When subjects logged on to the website for the experiment, they were taken
through a brief (5-minute) training sequence to familiarize them with using the
mouse to click in images, and to introduce some consistency in the manner in
which different subjects clicked in the images. The goal was for subjects to think
of the mouse as simply an extension of their eyes, so that they would simply look
around naturally in the image, and “let the mouse follow their eyes.” This is some-
what in contrast to the way that experienced computer users are accustomed to
using the mouse, in which each mouse click is the result of a deliberate action with
a specific desired result; therefore, a bit of unlearning was required for such sub-
jects to be able to treat each mouse click with less forethought. These instructions
had been honed previously at MediaAnalyzer for their own uses in analyzing how
people view advertisements, websites, and other marketing devices. At the be-
ginning of the training sequence, subjects were taught to simply press the mouse
button repeatedly and rapidly for periods of several seconds at a time, maintain-
ing a rate of at least 3–4 clicks per second. Next, subjects were taught to scan an
image and, within a limited time, click on targets that met certain predefined crite-
ria (these pages showed drawings of different food items with different price tags
attached; subjects were asked to click on the expensive items costing more than
$100 each). Finally subjects were shown several sample images in a format simi-
lar to that used for the main experimental sequence, and asked to view the image
naturally and click at locations that attracted their eye movements.
The main experimental sequence was the same as in the eye-tracking task: each
trial consisted of a central fixation cross followed by the stimulus image. Unlike the
eye-tracking task, we had no control over the size of the computer screen used to
view the images nor over the distance from which the subject observed the screen,
since subjects performed the task on their personal computers. We used 10 images
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Table 9.1. Shown here is a comparison between the fits of model predictions to fixations
from eye-tracking tasks, and clicks from the mouse-click task, for each of the model variants
introduced in the previous three chapters. The first five rows give the average normalized
scanpath salience (NSS), quantifying the degree of correspondence between a series of
spatial locations (eye fixations or mouse clicks) and the salience map predicted by one of
the models. The next five rows give each model’s performance as a percentage of the
theoretical maximum, defined by the NSS achieved by the inter-observer model.
Outdoor Fractal Satellite
fixations clicks fixations clicks fixations clicks
NSS
Random model -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Baseline salience model 0.69 0.43 0.44 0.84 0.62 0.73
Short-range interactions 0.75∗ 0.40 0.56∗ 0.85 0.71∗ 0.72
Contour-facilitation 0.72 0.40 0.60∗ 0.93∗ 0.81∗ 0.77∗
Inter-observer 1.30∗ 1.27∗ 1.13∗ 1.54∗ 1.10∗ 1.07∗
NSS % of Inter-observer NSS
Random model 0.00% 0.00% -0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03%
Baseline salience model 0.53% 0.34% 0.39% 0.54% 0.57% 0.68%
Short-range interactions 0.57% 0.31% 0.50% 0.55% 0.65% 0.67%
Contour-facilitation 0.55% 0.31% 0.53% 0.61% 0.74% 0.72%
Inter-observer 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
∗, models whose fit was significantly better than the corresponding baseline salience model, p <
0.05
from each of the overhead imagery, outdoor photos, and fractal images databases;
81 subjects completed the overhead imagery section, 43 completed the fractals, and
100 completed the outdoor photos.
9.3 Salience model fits with mouse clicks
Since we have data from many more subjects in the mouse-click task than in the
eye-tracking task, it is easier to judge the qualitative patterns of responses in the
mouse-click data. Figures 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 show several example images from each
image database, along with pooled responses from all subjects in the two tasks.
In the mouse-click data it is easier to visually identify significant clusters of re-
sponses; for example Figure 9.1a reveals several clusters around apparent roads
and inhabited regions.
We compared the mouse click sequences with the salience maps predicted by
the different variations of the salience model introduced over the last three chap-
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ters, using the normalized scanpath salience (NSS); these results are shown in Ta-
ble 9.1. In addition, we compared the NSS values observed for the mouse clicks
with those observed for the eye fixations in the eye-tracking tasks. As with the
eye-tracking results, we find that the baseline salience model gives NSS values for
the mouse clicks that are far above chance levels, ranging from 0.43 to 0.84. On
the other hand, the short-range orientation interactions, which produced signif-
icantly higher NSS scores for each of the three image classes in the eye-tracking
experiment, now produces no significant effect for any of the image classes in the
mouse clicking experiment. The contour-integration model continues to lead to a
significantly increased NSS score in the mouse click results for fractal and over-
head satellite images, the same two categories for which it produced a significant
increase in the NSS score in the eye-tracking results. Overall, the mouse clicks are
less well-predicted by the models in the outdoor images, but are somewhat better-
predicted by the models in the fractal and satellite images.
The relationships between the eye-tracking and mouse-clicking results suggest
that similar, but clearly distinct, mechanisms underlie each of the two behavioral
modalities. Our premise has been that a common attention-shifting mechanism,
perhaps driven by a salience map, is responsible for both behaviors. Yet differing
top-down attentional states are known to have dramatic effects on visual process-
ing; Lee et al. [1999] showed that the differences in psychophysical performance
between high-attention and low-attention conditions in the periphery could be ex-
plained by significant dynamic changes in the strength of self-excitation and in-
hibition. The model of short-range orientation interactions described in Chapter 7
was based on the high-attention parameters from Lee et al. [1999], and this channel
was shown to have a positive influence on the salience model’s ability to predict
eye movements. In contrast, we have seen here that it has no such influence on
the model’s ability to predict mouse clicks. Thus something has changed in the
processing sequence from visual to motor output that has changed which regions
are selected for closer inspection (either by an eye movement or by a mouse click).
Two possibilities arise:
• the internal salience map is different in the two cases, perhaps due to top-
down influences based on the different tasks contexts of the eye-tracking and
mouse-clicking experiments; or
• the internal salience map is computed identically in both cases, and the two
behaviors rely involve different mechanisms for selecting the next target.
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Or very likely, a combination a both. The first possibility is supported by the dif-
ferences in psychophysical performance due to attentional state [Lee et al., 1999],
and additionally by the fact that the mouse-click experiments were performed un-
der less well-controlled conditions than the eye-tracking experiments (e.g., subjects
were not isolated from distractions, their computer screens may not have been
placed in optimal lighting or at an optimal distance). The second possibility is
supported by the fact that eye movements and mouse clicking are likely to have
very different cost metrics for selecting a new fixation or click target, given the lo-
cation of the current target; it is very “cheap” to make an eye movement from one
side of screen to the other, while it is relatively “expensive” to move the mouse the
same distance (particularly if one is using the type of trackpad or pointing stick
common on current laptop computers). Thus an optimal eye movement scanpath
might involve large skips around the image, putting the priority on visiting all of
the most salient regions as soon as possible; on the other hand, an optimal mouse-
click sequence might be more measured, temporarily ignoring potentially salient
but distant targets in favor of fully exploring the current target area before moving
on to a new location.
In a variant approach using mouse clicks used by Parkhurst and Niebur [2003],
subjects first freely view each image as in the eye-tracking experiments, and then
after the trial was complete, click on “the five most interesting locations,” for ex-
ample. This avoids the possibility of subjects’ free-viewing of the images being
contaminated by simultaneous performance of the mouse clicking, which might,
for example, distract subjects from the scanpath that they might otherwise make.
On the other hand, waiting until the end of the trial to collect the mouse click
responses has a strong disadvantage in the context of our goal of studying bottom-
up attention, in that a much larger top-down component is likely to enter into
subjects’ decisions at the end of the trial. For example, after having viewed the
image for several seconds, subjects are likely to have formed certain declaration
conclusions about the image (“there is an airport at the lower left,” or “a woman
is running down the path”) and their decisions about which locations are inter-
esting are likely to be influenced by their declarative knowledge (“are there any
planes approaching the airport?” or “where is the woman going?”). In contrast,
by collecting mouse clicks (or eye movements) while subjects are in the process
of viewing the image, we instead gather information about which locations first
attracted their attention (and perhaps ultimately led them to their declarative con-
clusions about the image).
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long=w76.8750_w76.7500__lat=n34.6875_n34.7812
long=e45.7500_e45.8750__lat=n32.8438_n32.9375
(a) mouse clicks (b) eye fixations
(c) mouse clicks (d) eye fixations
Figure 9.1. Mouse clicks (a, c) from 81 subjects, and eye fixation locations (b, d) from 4
subjects, for two sample images from the overhead satellite imagery database.
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(a) mouse clicks (b) eye fixations
(c) mouse clicks (d) eye fixations
imk00004.50
imk00027.50
Figure 9.2. Mouse clicks (a, c) from 100 subjects, and eye fixation locations (b, d) from 4
subjects, for two sample images from the outdoor photos database.
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gnofract6
marine
(a) mouse clicks (b) eye fixations
(c) mouse clicks (d) eye fixations
Figure 9.3. Mouse clicks (a, c) from 43 subjects, and eye fixation locations (b, d) from 4
subjects, for two sample images from the fractals database.
CHAPTER 10
Conclusion
The working goal throughout this thesis has been to develop computational mod-
els that are not required to excel in any real-world task, except to faithfully mimic
the behavior of human vision. Of course, human vision works quite well most of
the time, so computational models that meet our stated goal may very well end
up being well-suited to a number of real-world tasks. This is the crossroads of
neuroscience-enabled machine vision, where biology meets engineering.
What have we learned about biology?
• In Chapter 2 we introduced three sets of schematic stimuli that are well suited
for computational studies of the categorization process. We showed that at
least one of these types of stimuli yields neural activation in the same brain
area (the fusiform face area) that known to be specifically activated by images
of real faces.
• In Chapter 3 we explored a number of existing computational models of cat-
egorization, as well as a new roaming exemplar model, and found that, con-
trary to the potential implications of existing models, human categorization
behavior need not rely on an unlimited memory capacity; on the contrary, for
the simple stimuli we used in these experiments, the models that most par-
simoniously explained subjects’ performance had fewer, rather than more,
stored memory traces.
• In Chapter 4 we saw, using multidimensional scaling (MDS), that human
observers are remarkably capable of acquiring internal representations for
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parametric stimuli that are highly similar to the representations that we, as
experimenters, used to design the stimuli (but which were unknown to the
subjects). We also found that two different tasks for building such represen-
tations produce similar results, and this will allow for future comparisons be-
tween studies in which human subjects have performed one task, and mon-
key subjects have performed the other.
• In Chapter 5 we used a simple model of early vision to demonstrate a poten-
tial mechanism by which the visual system might acquire the kind of inter-
mediate representation observed with MDS. This model was not specifically
tuned to perform categorization tasks, but the intermediate representations
generated by this model could be used to drive the categorization models
and match human behavior to within 10% of the accuracy achieved by the
original categorization models.
• In Chapter 6 we introduced several classes of images for use in eye-tracking
(and later, mouse-clicking) experiments, and introduced a salience model
framework for predicting fixation locations. We showed that the baseline
salience model is able to predict fixation locations with far better than chance
accuracy, in agreement with previous results. In absolute terms, we can say
that the salience model can predict a subject’s fixation locations over a period
of three seconds with roughly half the accuracy as would be achieved if the
predictions were instead based on other subjects’ fixation locations.
• In Chapter 7 we included into the salience model a set of short-range in-
hibitory interactions among orientation-tuned units, and showed that this
modified model was significantly better at predicting fixation locations than
was the baseline model. Thus the neural mechanisms implied by the short-
range interactions, previously supported by evidence from psychophysical
performance with highly-controlled but artificial stimuli, are now also sup-
ported by psychophysical performance in a less-restrictive task (free view-
ing) involving naturalistic stimuli.
• In Chapter 8 we tested a model of contour integration based on long-range
interactions among orientation-tuned units, included as a new channel in the
salience model. We found that this new channel was most useful in pre-
dicting the locations fixated by subjects in a task requiring attention to con-
tours, and was less useful in predicting the locations fixated in a simple free-
109
viewing task. Thus, although the model was accurately identifying contours,
we found that these contours are only weakly salient for human observers
unless there are specific reasons to attend to contours.
• Finally, in Chapter 9 we introduced mouse-clicking as an alternative to eye
tracking. This method allows people to participate in psychophysics exper-
iments from the privacy of their own web browsers, allowing us access to a
much larger subject pool. We compared the abilities of the different salience
model versions to predict fixation locations and mouse-click locations. While
in general the models were far above chance accuracy in predicting both
types of data, there were some notable differences. In particular, short-range
orientation interactions seem to offer no advantage in predicting mouse click
locations, in contrast to the significant improvement they provide in predict-
ing fixation locations. This suggests differences between the two tasks in the
neural mechanisms involving the salience map, either in the construction of
the map, or in the readout from the map, or a combination of both.
In addition to building our understanding of biological vision, we have strived
to develop computational algorithms that are efficient enough to be useful in real-
world machine vision applications. For example, the models of short-range ori-
entation interactions and eccentricity-dependent filtering described here have ef-
ficient implementations that have only minimal impact on the execution time of
the salience model, yet lead to significant improvements in the model’s ability
to match human behavior. In contrast, the model of contour-integration requires
roughly an order of magnitude more processing time and is weakly relevant to be-
havior in some task conditions, but is also critically important in predicting behav-
ior under other conditions such as the Gabor snakes that we tested, and also po-
tentially in real-world tasks like road-finding in overhead imagery. Taken together,
this suggests that a machine vision implementation might best compute an initial
salience map based on local features alone, and secondarily perform more com-
putationally intensive tasks like contour-integration or object-recognition within a
restricted window selected by the first stage. Such systems will ultimately be use-
ful both as stand-alone applications and as semi-automated assistants in tasks that
rely on a human executor. The interface between biology and engineering is rich
in research directions that will lead us closer not only toward understanding the
inner workings of vision, but also toward building machines that assist, interact,
collaborate, and synergize with real human visual systems.
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